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The CONNECT project (Coping with Fragmentation: Assessing and Reforming the 
current Architecture of Global Environmental Governance) is a project funded by the 
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). CONNECT (1) takes stock of 
the existing level of fragmentation across a number of issue-areas in global 
environmental politics; (2) explains the causes of fragmentation of global governance 
architectures based on a carefully designed set of variables; (3) analyses the 
implications of fragmentation across different scales of governance (i.e. international, 
regional and domestic levels); and finally, (4) suggests policy responses to increased 
fragmentation. 
Governance 
Governance refers to steering processes, systems and actors involved in addressing 
collective problems and guiding society towards socially desirable collective outcomes. 
Traditionally, the government is seen as provider of governance. However, today as 
well as in this report, individuals. the private sector, civil society and financial 
institutions etc., are also considered as contributors to governance.   
Governance Architecture  
An overarching system of public and private institutions that are valid or active in a 
particular issue area. It includes the array of governing institutions, regimes and other 
forms of principles, norms, regulations and procedures that govern the issue at hand.  
Governance Triangle 
The governance triangle is a heuristic framework developed by Abbott and Snidal, to 
structure and analyse governance of different issue areas (Abbott and Snidal 2009a; 
2009b; Abbott 2012). Within the triangle, institutions are placed based on their 
governing members (public, firm and CSO). Furthermore, the governance triangle is 
divided into seven zones, which represent the potential combinations of actor types 
(public, private and hybrid). Finally, the triangle highlights the governance institutions’ 
role (standards & commitments, operational activities, information & networking 
and/or financing).  
Governing Members 
Governing members refer to the actors involved in a governance institution holding a 
formal position to influence the rules, norms, operations or performance of the 
institution.  
Institutions 
Institutions are structures of rights, rules, norms, agreements and decision-making 
procedures that induce social practice or social order. Institutions assign roles to 
participants in that social practice or order and guide interactions among occupants of 
these roles.  
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Issue Area 
Issue areas refer to clusters of interests and perceptions towards a specific issue, 
which is constructed based on social and political processes. These clusters mobilise 
support for particular values and guide the approach to the issue at hand.  
Role (Database category) 
Role refers to the governance function of an institution. It is based on the primary 
activity, or two primary activities, by which the institution pursues its governance goal. 
Roles include ‘standards & commitments’, ‘operational activities’, ‘information & 
networking’ and ‘financing’.  
Transnational 
Transnational refers to operating across different levels, which could imply across 
country borders, among different organisations with different constituencies (public, 
private and/or subnational). In the case of this paper transnational refers primarily to 
institutions that govern or engage members beyond the state level and include actors 
from two or more countries.  
Type (Database category) 
Type refers to a categorization of governance institutions, which can be public, private 
or hybrid. Determining the type of an institution is based on the constituent members, 
which can be public actors (e.g. state governments, international organisations, cities 
and regions), private actors (e.g. firms, banks or business associations), or CSOs (e.g. 
NOGs and research institutes).  
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Convention for Biological Diversity 
Carbon Disclosure Project 
Conference of the Parties 
Civil Society Organisation 
European Commission 
European Union 
European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme 
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
Forest Stewardship Council 
International organisation 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
Monitoring, Reporting and Verification 
Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Change 
Non-governmental Organisation 
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil  
Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials 
Sustainable Development Goals 
United Nations 
United Nations Environment Program 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
World Wildlife Fund 
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Summary 
Global biodiversity governance today comprises more institutions than the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD) and other international biodiversity related conventions. A 
wide range of public and private actors organise themselves in various constellations 
around different issue areas, through which they also govern biodiversity. Increasingly, 
institutions established to govern issue areas such as agriculture, climate change, 
energy, fishery and forestry, influence biodiversity directly and indirectly. This report 
explores the expanding landscape of international and transnational institutions 
governing biodiversity.  
This report maps and visualises the institutional landscape of governing for 
biodiversity as well as provides a detailed replicable methodology suitable for 
exploring and analysing any given governance landscape. Starting with a sample of 
385 institutions governing climate change, agriculture, fisheries and forests, we 
identified a sub-set of 108 institutions. The selection was carried out following a 
conservative key-word analysis only considering institutions who clearly state a 
purpose to govern biodiversity. It is therefore possible that the universe of institutions 
in the landscape is larger than concluded in this report. The selected institutions have 
been individually scrutinised, and this report presents an exploratory analysis of the 
types of institutions in the institutional landscape of governing for biodiversity and 
their functions. 
The report comprises: 1) a visualisation ordering the collection of biodiversity-relevant 
institutions by types of actors and by the functions they employ to reach their 
biodiversity governance objectives; 2) a range of descriptive statistics and graphs 
aimed at exploring and mapping political agency by showing who is involved, when 
and where they operate from; 3) an analysis of institutions monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) frameworks, exploring potential checks and balances, transparency 
and the degree of institutionalisation; 4) eight case studies, providing an in depth 
depiction of how different types of institutions operate, the stakeholders they involve 
and their achievements relevant to biodiversity governance. 
The results suggest the following:  
1. Biodiversity governance has changed from being predominantly carried out by 
public actors towards increasing multi-stakeholder participation. As of December, 
2016, at least 9641 unique public and private actors are actively engaging with 
biodiversity governance.  
2. About half of the institutions are purely public. However, private actors including 
civil society organisations, companies and investors, comprise roughly two thirds 
of the active members involved with in the entire biodiversity governance 
landscape.  
3. Besides hybrid institutions (those engaging all types of actors: Public, private and 
CSO), joint governance is most frequently public-CSO and CSO-firm.  
4. Certain functional types of governance (what we refer to as roles) stand out as the 
preferred way for institutions to achieve their biodiversity governance objectives. 
Standards and commitments is most commonly applied followed by information 
and networking.  
5. Biodiversity governing institutions most frequently frame their activities under the 
scope of conservation (81%) followed by a significant proportion promoting 
sustainable use (35%), whereas only few accentuate access and benefit sharing 
(5%). 
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6. Considering MRV, 45 (82%) of the 55 transnational institutions in the institutional 
landscape implement at least monitoring, 42 (76%) also publish reports and 21 
(47%) also verify their actions through third party verification procedures. 
7. Third part verification is used mainly in the institutions where it is essential to the 
mode of operation. 17 (85%) of the 20 institutions enforcing standards and 
certification have full MRV frameworks in place.  
 
Transnational institutions have a lower degree of enforcement power than their 
international counterparts. Therefore, we assess MRV as a mean of checks and 
balances, important to ensure that desired progress and outcomes are achieved. Our 
MRV analysis focuses on eight transnational institutions, as these generally have a 
lower degree of enforcement power and mechanisms at hand compared to their 
international counterparts. The results reveal that only 7 of the 55 transnational 
institutions operate without an MRV framework, whereas 42 conducts both monitoring 
and reporting, and 21 apply third-party verification. In sum, our results indicate a 
surprisingly high level of checks and balances as well as a high degree of 
institutionalisation. 
Case studies of eight transnational institutions highlight that biodiversity governance 
comes in many shapes and sizes, which in turn is reflected in the variety in types of 
output and outcomes. All cases show signs of output level performance relevant to 
governing biodiversity; four cases show signs of biodiversity relevant outcomes; and 
all cases lack proven direct biodiversity impacts. The lack of direct biodiversity impacts 
may reflect an inherent difficulty in evaluating impacts rather than overall performance 
failure. The lack of counterfactuals against which institutions’ actions can be 
measured, along with the fact that most impacts will only become apparent over a 
longer time-scale, makes a meaningful assessment of direct impacts difficult at best.  
In conclusion, the institutional landscape of governing for biodiversity is characterised 
by a multitude of actors and institutions occupied with governing biodiversity through 
different issue areas. This report maps, visualizes and analyse aspects of the 
institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity. It shows that biodiversity 
governance has moved from being governed primarily by public institutions towards a 
much more diverse set of private and public actors having gained significant agency. 
The results and methodology presented here provide a robust foundation, relevant to 
practitioners, policymakers and scholars interested in further assessing the institutions 
and the actions taken in the name of governing biodiversity. Considering the extent to 
which biodiversity governance is carried out through institutions that are not primarily 
focused on biodiversity, it begs the question whether this is similarly the case for 
issues such as climate change, energy or agriculture. An important next step is to 
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1 Introduction 
International and transnational biodiversity governance in the 21st century has 
expanded beyond the activities carried out under the Convention for Biological 
Diversity (CBD). Governance mechanisms across a broad range of issue areas such as 
climate change and forestry have become important for biodiversity. Therefore, rather 
than treating biodiversity as an isolated issue area, this report presents a holistic 
understanding of the various institutions addressing biodiversity. The report 
scrutinizes how institutions with primary focus on five issue areas of importance for 
biodiversity (climate change, forestry, agriculture, fisheries and energy) create an 
increasingly complex institutional landscape of governing for biodiversity. 
Transnational institutions in particular play an increasingly important role in global 
governance of sustainable development and other environmental issue areas including 
biodiversity (Abbott and Snidal 2010; Bulkelaey et al. 2014). These developments are 
embodied in the UN’s Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17, encouraging enhancing 
“the global partnership for sustainable development, complemented by multi-
stakeholder partnerships…” (UN 2015: SDG 17.17). Also the biodiversity regime 
recognizes the role of transnational action; the CBD’s Aichi Biodiversity Targets 
suggest that “By 2020, at the latest, Governments, business and stakeholders at all 
levels have taken steps to achieve or have implemented plans for sustainable 
production and consumption” (CBD 2010: Annex I, Target 4). The expanding 
institutional landscape has been documented across several issue areas and in various 
databases (see e.g. Widerberg and Stripple 2016). For instance, on climate change, the 
UNFCCC’s platform Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) currently lists 77 
institutions linked to climate change, while the United Nation Partnerships for SDGs 
platform contains 2161 initiatives and action networks related to the 17 SDGs. 
The expanding institutional landscape of governing biodiversity raises questions 
regarding performance including legitimacy, transparency, and effectiveness. It forces 
researchers to look beyond individual institutions (Bulkeley et al. 2014) and instead 
study the broader governance architecture and interactions between institutions. To 
this end, this report maps and explores the institutional landscape of governing for 
biodiversity1. The report maps and explores the collection of institutions2 undertaking 
biodiversity governance using a generalizable methodology that can be applied for 
conducting holistic studies of environmental governance of any given issue area. The 
analysis is guided by six questions:  
1. What institutions occupy the institutional landscape of governing for biodiversity 
internationally and transnationally? 
2. What roles do institutions in the institutional landscape of governing for 
biodiversity take on?  
3. What themes do institutions in the institutional landscape of governing for 
biodiversity focus on? 
                                               
1
  In the institutional landscape of governing for biodiversity, the report includes institutions 
with a primary stated goal of governing a selection of issue areas of importance for 
biodiversity, including agriculture, climate change, energy, fisheries and forestry. Data was 
taken from the CONNECT project (see: http://fragmentation.eu/ for more information).  
2
  The concepts institutions and initiatives are to some degree used interchangeably 
throughout the report. In the context of the database, institutions can be perceived as a 
broader definition that encompasses initiatives, projects, intergovernmental agreements and 
protocols. 
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4. To what extent do institutions in the sample implement procedures for 
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)? 
5. What are the effects (outputs and outcomes) of institutions in the institutional 
landscape of governing for biodiversity? 
 
Starting with a sample of 385 institutions governing climate change, energy, 
agriculture, fisheries and forests (what is referred to as ‘governance for biodiversity’, 
see Figure 1 below), the report identifies a sub-set of 108 institutions. The subsequent 
inquiry proceeds in four steps. It provides, first, a map of the institutional landscape 
which orders the collection of institutions by types of actors and by the functions they 
employ to reach their biodiversity governance objectives. Second, a range of 
descriptive statistics and graphs exploring and mapping political agency by showing 
who is involved in the different institutions, when the institutions were initiated and 
where they operate from. Third, an analysis of MRV procedures in 55 transnational 
institutions, which informs about potential checks and balances, transparency and the 
degree of institutionalisation within the landscape. Four, eight case studies exemplify 
the variety of different transnational institutions and to give an in-depth depiction of 
how these different types of institutions operate, what stakeholders they involve and 
whether they produce tangible outputs and outcomes relevant to biodiversity 
governance. 
The results show an institutional landscape characterised by a wide variety of actors 
and institutions occupied with governing biodiversity through different issue areas. 
Furthermore, the report illustrates how biodiversity governance has moved from being 
governed primarily by public institutions towards a much more inclusive structure 
where private actors have gained significant agency. Finally, the results provide a 
robust foundation, relevant to practitioners, policymakers and scholars interested in 
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Figure 1 Governance for biodiversity and its connection to governance of 
biodiversity (PBL 2017).
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2 Methods: Mapping the institutional landscape of 
governing for biodiversity  
This section defines the methodology for mapping the institutional landscape of 
governing for biodiversity. The study initially considered 385 institutions primarily 
focusing on governing five different issue areas of importance for biodiversity: 
agriculture, climate change, energy, fisheries and forestry (see Leadley et al, 2014). 
The data is provided by the CONNECT-project3, an IVM research project assessing 
governance fragmentation across the five issue areas mentioned above. The extended 
methodology behind the initial data collection can be found in Widerberg, Pattberg, 
and Kristensen (2016). 
The criteria for including institutions are as follows: the report includes “(i) 
international and transnational institutions, which not only have the (ii) intentionality 
to steer policy and the behaviour of their members or a broader community, but also 
explicitly mention the (iii) common governance goal, accomplishable by (iv) significant 
governance functions” (Widerberg, Pattberg, and Kristensen 2016: pp 13). 
Next, the database has been created through a selection process (see Figure 2) where:  
1. Institutions were selected using semi-automated keywords analysis;  
2. The excluded institutions were forwarded for expert review;  
3. The institutions identified for potential inclusion despite lack of relevant keywords 
were examined in depth to determine whether or not to finally include them. 
2.1 Criteria and selection 
Institutions in the dataset explicitly intend to govern biodiversity. These were 
identified through a keywords analysis of institutions’ self-formulated governance 
statements (see Figure 2), downloaded from the institutions’ websites. The type of 
statements included are: “Mission/Vision”, “About”, “Strategy”, “What we do”, 
“Objectives”, “Function”, “Operation”, “Background”, “Work Areas”, “Guiding Principles” 
and “Charters”. Subsequently, a set of keywords relevant to biodiversity governance 
were identified through a literary analysis and expert consultation (see Annex A.1 for 
an overview of the chosen words). First, the Convention on Biological Diversity’s (CBD) 
strategic plan for 2020 was analysed for keywords. These were then reviewed and 
supplemented by experts in the field as well as a review of available literature on 
biodiversity-governance (See e.g. Bladon et al. 2016; Jaco Barendse et al. 2016; 
Carvalho-Santos et al. 2016; Li et al. 2016). For words where several forms of the word 
exist, e.g. conservation, conserving, conserve, the roots of the words, e.g. “conserv”, 
were included. In cases were different combinations exist, e.g. “manage sustainably”, 
“sustainably manage” and “sustainable management”, all were included.  
                                               
3
  For more information see the project homepage: http://fragmentation.eu/  
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Figure 2 Selection process for creating database 
To further narrow down the dataset to a manageable size, the following steps were 
taken (see also Figure 2): 
1. Synchronisation: Statements and keywords were synchronised to ensure matching 
formats. All special characters were removed, all letters were changed to lower 
case, lists and bullet-points were dissolved and double-spacing removed. 
2. Categorization: Keywords were divided into two categories, strong indicators and 
weak indicators. The former group included: “biodiversity”, “biological diversity”, 
“cbd”, “convention on biological diversity”, “ecosystem services” and “protected 
areas”. All remaining words (see Annex A.1) were added to the second group. 
3. Selection round 1: The statements were scanned for keywords. If a statement 
included at least one of the strong indicators, the corresponding institution was 
added directly to the final database. If a statement mentioned at least one of the 
weak indicators it was reviewed manually before potentially adding the 
corresponding institution to the database. In this process 93 institutions were 
added (See Figure 2). If no keywords were mentioned, the corresponding 
institution would be added to a separate non-select database; 292 institutions 
were added to this. 
4. Selection round 2: In round 2, the excluded institutions were forwarded to a 
group of biodiversity experts who manually reviewed and identified potential 
institutions for inclusion, returning 34 institutions of potential relevance. 
5. Selection round 3: The 34 institutions from selection round 2, were checked in 
detail by the IVM research team and compared to the initial criteria for inclusion. 
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15 of these institutions were added to the database. The final database mapping 
the institutional landscape for governing biodiversity consists of 108 institutions. 
2.2 Visualizing the governance architecture 
Descriptive data were collected for all institutions in the dataset on: Year of inception, 
actor-types, primary focus, role, number of governing members (see Widerberg, 
Pattberg, and Kristensen 2016), as well as, a detailed overview of potential MRV 
frameworks. 
For mapping the institutional architecture the report uses a ‘governance triangle’ (see 
Figure 3), an heuristic framework developed by Abbot and Snidal (Abbott and Snidal 
2009a; 2009b; Abbott 2012). Institutions’ positions in the triangle are determined by 
the types of governing members (public, private or civil society organisations) and 
other participants essential to institutional operation of rules and norms, i.e. their 
actors. The table below outlines the three actor-categories included. The categories are 
designed to include all potential actors in transnational governance. Where individuals 
make up the governing actors, the data include the entity that the actors represent. 
Table 1 Actor categories divided into three types 
Public  Individual states 
 Collection of states 
 Cities 
 Regions 
 International organisations (IOs) 
Firm  Businesses 
 Investors 
 Industry associations 
CSO  Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
 Other CSOs 
 CSO networks and coalitions 
 
The triangles are divided into seven zones (see Figure 3) representing the potential 
combinations of actor types. Institutions in zones 1-3 are dominated by a single type 
of actor (see above). Those in zones 4-6 involve two actor types, and those in the 
central 7th zone involve all three types of actors. Additionally, the triangle is divided 
into three ‘tiers’, the public tier where public actors are dominant, the private tier 
where firms and CSO are dominant and the hybrid tier where government bodies share 
governance with firms and/or CSO in public-private partnerships  
The colour scheme assigned to institutions in the triangle depicts their role, or 
governance function4: Standards and commitments (red), operational activities 
(orange), information & networking (green) and financing (blue). These roles are not 
necessarily employed on an either/or basis, some institutions engage through several. 
Institutions under standards & commitments use functions such as rule-making and 
implementation, mandatory compliance, standards for measurement and disclosure of 
activities, certification schemes and voluntary and private standards and commitments. 
Operational institutions employ, for example, technology research and development, 
                                               
4
  The role of an institution is based on its primary activity, or two primary activities related to 
the way they pursue their primary governance goal (i.e. the goal related to either agriculture, 
climate change, energy, fishery, forestry or a combination of one or more of these). 
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(pilot) project implementation, demonstration and deployment of activities, skills 
enhancement, and best practice dissemination. Financing institutions primarily finance 
operational activities. Finally, institutions facilitating information-sharing and 
networking (information & networking) provide technical consulting, training, and 
information services to build capacity, share knowledge, and support local government 
(Widerberg, Pattberg, and Kristensen 2016). In the governance decagons (see Figure 
4), the institutions are ordered and visualised according to their role instead of actor 
compositions. 
Four governance triangles and decagons, representing four different institutional 
clusters, are presented. The clusters are defined based on key approaches relevant to, 
and used in, governing biodiversity. A key feature in the CBD’s 2010 strategic goals 
and the Aichi targets is the aim to govern biodiversity through different approaches 
including: 1) conservation of e.g. habitats, species and genetic diversity, 2) sustainable 
use of e.g. forest products allowing for co-occurrence of socio-economic and develop 
and ecosystem maintenance and 3) access and benefit sharing, ensuring that 
sustainable development and benefits from such are shared equitably amongst 
relevant stakeholders. A fourth cluster contains all the institutions in the biodiversity 
governance landscape.  
The three clusters, conservation, sustainable use and access and benefit sharing, were 
created according to a keyword analysis. Keywords relevant to the three governance 
themes were selected from the CBD’s strategic goals and Aichi targets (CBD 2010: 
Annexes I and IV) by a group of researchers and experts in the field of biodiversity (see 
Annex A.2). There are several overlaps between the clusters, as many of the 
institutions use several approaches to govern biodiversity. 
2.3 Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) 
For examining the degree of institutionalization of institutions in the dataset, the 
report assesses whether they have MRV procedures in place. In this examination, we 
focus on transnational institutions. Compared to their international counterparts, 
voluntary transnational institutions have a lower degree of enforcement power and 
mechanisms at their disposal. In addition, authors such as Pattberg and Widerberg 
(2016) argue that MRV increases the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder initiatives by 
enabling organisational learning as well as increases accountability and transparency, 
resulting in a higher level of institutional legitimacy (see also: Bäckstrand 2012; Gupta 
and Mason 2014). 
The report distinguishes between the M, R and V and considers whether an institution 
has a framework in place to monitor and/or evaluate their outputs and outcomes and 
potential impacts (M), whether these findings are reported - ideally to the public (R), 
and whether the outputs, outcomes and/or impacts are verified (V). Finally, the report 
distinguishes between internal and third party verification. 
To determine if an institution employs monitoring and/or reporting we consider 
whether it has a formal framework in place (or a clause in their charter requiring 
monitoring/reporting), as well as whether the institution publish progress reports, 
annual reports and/or project updates. In case of clear published information on 
activities an institution is assigned both M and R. If only a clause is in place, without 
signs of activity and any type of publications, an institution is assigned nothing, M or R 
depending on the specific wording. In order to qualify for verification in our coding, an 
institution is required to explicitly state that their standard, outputs and/or impacts 
are verified either by the institution itself or by a third party. 
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2.4 Case studies 
The final part of the analysis consists of eight case studies conducted to provide an 
overview the diversity of institutions in the database. The case studies were chosen 
from a sub-selection of institutions that 1) are transnational and 2) include Dutch 
actors (public and private). Four institutions including the Dutch government as an 
actor and four institutions include Dutch private sector actors (e.g. Unilever, Shell, 
Heineken, Philips and Ahold). For an overview, see Table 2. 
Table 2  The selection of eight case studies. 
Institutions including the Dutch 
Government 
Institutions including the Dutch  
private actors 
1. Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP) 
2. Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPC) 
3. The Global Partnership on Forest 
Landscape Restoration (GPFLR) 
4. Sustainable Food Systems Programme 
(SFSP) 
1. Global G.A.P (GGAP) 
2. The Roundtable on Sustainable 
Biomaterials (RSB) 
3. Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform 
(SAI) 
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3 Mapping the institutional landscape of governing for 
biodiversity 
This section presents a mapping of the institutional landscape of governing for 
biodiversity. We provide an overview of the institutional landscape on governing for 
biodiversity using four governance triangles and decagons, as well as summary 
statistics. The graphical overview is made for four clusters of biodiversity governing 
institutions, whereas the summary statistics are given only for the cluster containing 
all the institutions. 
3.1 Institutional overview: Governance triangle and decagon 
The governance triangles (Figures 3 and 4) show the institutions in the biodiversity 
governance landscape sorted by the type of governance they engage in, i.e. public, 
private or a mix of the two. The heuristic is modified from Abbott and Snidal (2009a; 
2009b; Abbott 2012) and combined with the international regime complex approach 
presented by Keohane and Victor (2011). Each of the four triangles visualises a cluster 
in the institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity: a) All institutions in the 
institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity (n=108), b) Conservation cluster 
(n=87), c) Sustainable Use cluster (n=38) and d) the Access and Benefit sharing cluster 
(n=5). Additionally, the decagons (Figures 5 and 6) provide an important contribution 
by reordering the visual according to roles (i.e. the main governance functions). Also, 
descriptive information on the institutions contained in Figures 3a and 4a is shown in 
Table 3 and Figure 4. 
 
IVM Institute for Environmental Studies  
 28  Mapping the institutional landscape of governing for biodiversity 




Figure 3 Governance triangles visualising different clusters in the institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity: a) shows all 
institutions (n = 108), and b) the Conservation cluster (n = 87). 
 
 
Standards & Commitments Operational










































































































Standards & Commitments Operational

























































































IVM Institute for Environmental Studies 
Beyond the CBD 29 
    
 
  
Figure 4 Governance triangles visualising different clusters in the institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity: c) shows the 
Sustainable Use cluster (n=38) and d) the Access and Benefit sharing cluster (n=5). 
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Figure 5  Governance decagons, each visualising a cluster in the institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity: a) All institutions 
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Figure 6 Four different governance decagons, each visualising a cluster in the institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity: c) 




















































IVM Institute for Environmental Studies  
 32  Mapping the institutional landscape of governing for biodiversity 
    
 



































































































































































































1 23 1 7 2 4 5 1 10 0 0 53 49.1  
2 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 6 5.6  
3 11 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 16 14.8  
4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.9  
5 2 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 7 6.5  
6 5 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 10 9.2  
7 1 2 4 0 0 4 1 1 1 1 15 13.9  
Total 
(Role) 
43 6 16 3 5 15 2 14 1 3 108 100% 
 
 
Looking at all the institutions in Figure 3a, we can observe that public institutions are 
dominant in numbers. 49% of all the institutions consist solely of public actors, and 
these participate in 70% of the institutions. This prevalence is largely due to the 
presence of institutions that govern biodiversity next to fishery and forestry. 22 of 37 
(59%) fishery related institution and 26 of 48 (49%) forest related institutions (49%) are 
purely public (see Annex B). Together these two issue areas cover 48 of the 53 
institution in zone 1. They largely consist of international agreements and protocols 
such as the CDB’s Nagoya Protocol or the various regional FAO fishery agreements 
such as the Western Central Atlantic Fishery Commission and the European Inland 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Advisory Commission. Looking at the other issue areas, 
there are no institution related to agriculture in zone 1 and only three related to 
climate change. 
Compared to the distribution of institutions governing climate change (see Widerberg, 
Pattberg, and Kristensen 2016), the presence of business actors is relatively low in the 
institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity. In the climate change governance 
architecture, 16% of all institutions are composed entirely of firm actors and they take 
part in 65%, whereas only 6% of the biodiversity institutions are governed purely by 
firms who partake in 30%. Making the same comparison with CSO actors, they are 
slightly more dominant in the institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity, 
where they are represented in 44% (39% for climate change) and stand alone in 15% 
(6% for climate change). 
This difference between private actors in climate change and biodiversity governance 
reflects well the general level of attention given to climate change over biodiversity in 
the business sector. First of all, from the international community, there has been 
more focus on engaging firm actors in relation to climate change e.g. through wide 
spanning emission trading schemes such as the EU ETS and through increase reporting 
as provided by the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) as well as various carbon offsetting 
initiatives. Additionally, the relationships between most types of production and 
greenhouse gas emissions are arguably better understood and more widely 
acknowledged than the relations between many types of production and biodiversity. 
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Looking at biodiversity impacts they are mainly associated with products related to 
forest use, such as timber, palm oil and biofuels. This is also reflected in the 
institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity where private actors 
predominantly engage through standard and certification minded institutions such as 
RSPO, Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) and the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC) (see also Annex B). 
Considering the different clusters, we see that conservation, included in the narrative 
of 87 (81%) of the institutions, is clearly the most commonly approach to biodiversity 
governance. Sustainable use is used as a mode of governance in 38 (35%) of the 
institutions, whereas access and benefit sharing is practiced in only 5 (5%). This is not 
surprising considering that conservation and protectionism is the easiest to implement 
and also the oldest approach in governing biodiversity and habitats. 
The dominance of public institutions is reflected across all clusters. In fact, it increases 
as we move from conservation towards sustainable use and access and benefit 
sharing. Pertaining to conservation, 52% are purely public and 70% have public actors 
participating. In the sustainable use cluster the numbers are 63% and 75% and for 
access and benefit sharing 60% and 100%. 
Standards and Commitments (S&C) and Information and Networking (I&N) are the two 
most common functional modes (roles) across the institutional landscape on governing 
for biodiversity. 40% of the institutions govern primarily using S&C and 58% include it 
in their functional portfolio. Considering I&N it is used on its own in 15% of the 
institutions and 44% employs it in tandem with another role. Financing is only used as 
part of the portfolio in 8% of the institutions, whereas Operational is used in 27%. 
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Figure 7  Roles and types distribution across zones. Zone 4 is excluded as it only has 
one institution (role 3). The numbers 1-10 in the pies signify the role 
classifiers, not the number of institutions. 
3.2 Institutional members  
As of December 2016, dataset included 9641 unique governing members (see table 4). The 
distribution of members across zones (Figure 6) adds to the information provided in the 
governance triangles. It suggests that public actors are not necessarily dominant despite 
their overwhelming relative presence in 70% of institutions. Whereas zones with public 
presence contain 5333 (55%) of the members, zones with private actor presence contain 
8641 (90%) members. The figures and table above clearly illustrate that the shift from 
public towards private and multi-stakeholder environmental governance, as outlined by for 
instance by Bulkeley et al. (2014), also manifests itself in the field of biodiversity 
governance. Zones 4,5,6 and 7 – where more than one type of actor govern – contain 63% 
of the total members and 80% of the unique members. 
The large difference between total and unique public members demonstrates that public 
actors, particularly countries, more frequently partake in multiple institutions than their 
private counterparts. Looking at participation frequency, 170 countries partake in 10 or 
more institutions 92 in 15 or more and 31 in more than 20. France for instance participates 
in 29 institutions, the United Kingdom in 25 and Congo and the Netherlands in 23, Gabon, 
Ghana and Kenya in 22 and the Philippines in 21. Considering the CSO category, only 5 
actors, including the WWF, The Nature Conservancy and Bird Life take part in more than 6 
institutions. Finally, only two firms partake in maximum 4 institutions.  
Zone 1 (n = 53) Zone 2 (n = 6) 
Zone 5 (n = 7) Zone 6 (n = 10)
Zone 3 (n = 16)
Zone 7 (n = 15)
1. Standards & Commitments 2. Operational
3. Information & Networking 4. Financing
5. Standards & Commitments + Operational 6. Operational + Information & Networking
7. Information & Networking + Financing 8. Standards & Commitments + Information & Networking
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Figure 8 Active governing members in the 108 intuitions across seven zones. Note: 
The unique counts are calculated on a zone-to-zone basis meaning that 
there are still potential overlaps between zones. N = 12796 (left) and 
10048 (right). The unique number of members calculated across all the 


















Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5 Zone 6 Zone 7
 
IVM Institute for Environmental Studies 
Beyond the CBD 37 
    
 
4 Monitoring, reporting and verification in the 
institutional landscape on governance for biodiversity 
This section presents an MRV assessment of transnational initiatives within the 
institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity. First, it provides an assessment 
of 55 transnational institutions and second, it presents eight case studies examine 
what the institutions aim to do, who they include, what they do, how they do it and 
whether or not they are successful in achieving their objectives. 
4.1 MRV assessment 
MRV frameworks are important to establish legitimacy through increasing institutional 
transparency and accountability (Widerberg and Pattberg 2016). MRV practices vary 
substantially across the transnational segment of the institutional landscape on 
governing for biodiversity (see Annex C). Some institutions such as the information 
network Allfish, for instance, do not provide any information regarding what they do or 
whether they are successful in pursuing their goals. A few, including the High Sea 
Alliance, have clauses in their framework mentioning that they carry out monitoring, 
but do not publish any information regarding potential findings. Most institutions, 
including the World Ocean Council and the WWF's Global Forest and Trade Network 
clearly monitor their activities and report information of this publicly through regular 
progress updates, annual reports, research or similar documents. Finally, several 
institutions, particularly standards and certification schemes, for example UTZ and the 
BCI, have full-fledged monitoring, evaluation, reporting and verification mechanisms in 
place. In addition, the vast majority of these uses third-party certification bodies, but 
two institutions carry out their own verification. Aside from increasing institutions’ 
transparency and legitimacy, MRV is also important to assess their degree of 
institutionalisation and helps to scope potential governance impacts. The graph below 
gives an overview of MRV for the 55 transnational institutions in the institutional 
landscape. A full overview showing individual institutions along with a brief description 
of their level and type of MRV can be found in Annex C. 
 
Figure 9 Distribution of M, MR and MRV frameworks across 55 transnational 
institutions in the institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity. 
The graph should be interpreted as the number of institutions with at least 
the specific levels of MRV. 7 institutions had no MRV and 3 had their 
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Of the 55 transnational institutions institutional landscape, 82% have a monitoring 
framework, 76% publish reports on their activities, outputs, outcomes and/or impacts, 
42% also implements some kind of verification and 36% have a full MRV framework 
with third party verification in place. Only seven institutions (13%) do not have any 
monitoring, reporting or verification in place. The general decreasing trend was 
expected as one would expect that fewer do more. However, that so many institutions 
implement the full MRV package is surprising.  
Transnational institutions have been criticised for lacking transparency and 
accountability (see e.g. Bulkeley et al. 2014). Therefore, it is surprising that a majority 
of the institutions are taking action towards improving this. Additionally, when 
institutions implement verification it is interesting and positive that they seem to do so 
almost entirely through third-party verifiers. Of the 23 institutions using verification, 
only the Global Partnerships for Responsible Fisheries (FishCode Programme) and The 
Gold Standard do not claim to use third-party verifiers. This indicates that the added 
value of internal verification, in terms of legitimacy, is perceived to be lower than for 
third party verification. 
Monitoring and reporting are useful and important for transparency and show whether 
an institution is active in trying to achieve what it says it want to accomplish. As for 
verification, however, it is arguably of varying importance depending on the activities 
of specific institutions. For instance, for a standard and certification institutions like 
the RSPO or the FSC, verification is essential to ensure and confirm that their activities 
have the intended effect. For information and knowledge networks such as IFOAM, 
Organics International or the Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP), the added value 
of verification is lower as these types of institutions to achieve fewer tangible targets.  
The results indicate that institutions, for which MRV are more important, are more 
prone to have an MRV framework in place. Of the 20 institutions working through 
standards and commitments, 18 (90%) has some sort of verification mechanism and 17 
(85%) implements full third party verification. In comparison, none of the 9 institutions 
working through information and networking have a verification mechanism in place 
and three (33%) do not engage with any form of monitoring or reporting. 
4.2 Case study analyses 
This section presents and discusses eight case studies selected from the 55 
transnational institutions in the institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity. 
The case studies provide an overview of the institutions’ background and objective, 
their operational structure, the way they engage members, their potential MRV 
frameworks as well as an assessment of potential outputs, outcomes and impacts. The 
analyses provide an overview of how eight different institutions operate and how they 
perform. Due to limited availability of academic literature on the eight cases, most 
information has been derived from their respective websites and self-reported 
information such as annual reports, newsletters and organisational charters. 
The evaluation separates between output, outcome and impact level performance 
(Easton 1965). Output are the concrete actions taken by institutions. Such actions 
could for instance be the implementation of a standardization scheme to avoid 
deforestation and habitat losses. Outcome refers to the effectiveness of institutions in 
instigating societal or behavioural changes through their outputs. For instance, a 
company subscribing and adhering to a standard, thereby changing their conducts 
related to e.g. farming or tree logging, constitutes an outcome. Finally, impact refers 
to environmental changes resulting from the outcomes of the institutions’ actions. 
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This could for instance be the successful preservation of a species, or the protection of 
a species’ natural habitat. 
Performance in this report is assessed at the outcome level. Although, it is possible to 
make some general statements regarding the potential impact on biodiversity levels 
for some of intuitions over time, it is not possible to assess the de facto impacts. First, 
there are no counterfactuals against which the impacts can be measured, and second, 
the actual impacts on decreasing biodiversity can only be assessed over a longer time 
period. Second, data is missing for the specific locations in which a given institution 
operates. However, some approximation regarding the impact potential of the 
different case-studies is presented. These are largely based on the possible long term 
effects of e.g. a standard scheme, assuming continued implementation and adherence 
of actors.  
Although the case-study results cannot be used to gauge general trends in the 
institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity, they do provide important and 
insightful information regarding how different types of institutions operate. Apart from 
the two standard and certification schemes GGAP and RSB, the case-studies have 
different functions. Four institutions do networking but with different emphasis. CBFP 
facilitates between funds and projects initiators, GPFLR focus on learning, SAI provides 
an information platform based on the knowledge available in its network and WBCSD 
hosts a large network of businesses initiating several activities such as reporting, 
standard creation and project implementation. Additionally, FCFP funds and assists 
projects related to REDD+ activities. 
In the summary table below we see several clear trends including:  
1. All the institutions have monitoring and reporting mechanisms in place and all 
publish reports to the public. However, only the two standard and certification 
schemes, GGAP and RSB, employ verification procedures (both third party 
verification).  
2. All provide some degree of publicly information as well as regular updates.  
3. All eight institutions have proven some outputs relevant to biodiversity 
governance. The youngest, SFSP, only have basic structural outputs as it is still 
being established.  
4. Half of the institutions show a high level of biodiversity relevant performance. In 
the case of the two certification schemes SAI and GGAP, outcomes include the 
successful implementation of their standards which are intended to govern 
biodiversity. The WBCSD’s performance is mainly constituted by the 
implementation of their sustainability reporting standard which encourage 
increased sustainable conduct within businesses related to issues such as water, 
climate and biodiversity. 
5. None of the institutions have proven any biodiversity impacts. For the standards 
and certification schemes impacts are likely occurring, but there are two obstacles 
to measuring them. First, there are no counterfactual to measure potential impacts 
against, and second, impacts will likely materialise only time. For all of the 
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Table 4 Summary table of case study findings 
 
CBFP FCPF GPFLR SFSP GGAP RSB SAI WBCSD 
Actor Types 
Public /  
CSO /Firm 
Public /  
CSO /Firm 
Public /  
CSO 
Public /  
CSO /Firm 
Firm 
Public /  
CSO /Firm 
Firm Firm 



















Year 2002 2008 2003 2015 1997 2007 2010 1995 
M Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
V No No No No Yes Yes No No 
Public 
information 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observed 
performance 
No data Yes No data No data Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
4.2.1 Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP) 
Start year 2002 
Membership 
type 
Hybrid: Public, CSO and firm actors have governing capacity 
Members 79 
Website http://pfbc-cbfp.org/home.html  
MRV 
Monitoring and reporting is in place and made public. No verification 
procedure. 
Outputs Yes. Active institution publishing structural updates and news. 
Performance No clear outcomes or impacts. 
 
Background and objective 
The Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP) was launched as a multi-stakeholder 
partnership at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. It 
comprises 79 members including governments from developed and developing 
countries, IOs, NGOs, regional organisations and firms. In addition to the key 
overarching activities of promoting conservation and sustainable management of 
forests in the Congo Basin, the first clause of the CBFP’s Cooperation Framework is: 
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“The shared goal of CBFP partners is to improve effective technical and financial 
support for biodiversity conservation, sustainable management of forest ecosystems, 
and the alleviation of poverty in Central African countries.”5 
CBFP does not take a direct role in implementing or financing programs, but serves as 
a mediator between donor and implementing agencies as well as a forum providing 
dialogue between its partners. 
Biodiversity governance 
Membership and participation 
The CBPF membership is diverse, spanning several state and non-state actors from 
regional and international contexts as well as developing and developed countries. 
They have identified and engaged key regional partners, for instance COMIFAC and 
Observatory for the Forests of Central Africa (OFCA), important considering to the 
regionally centred objectives of the partnership.  
The partnership does not have a central administration but is facilitated in two year 
periods by member governments. All CBFP members have access to the annual 
meeting of parties where they share information and knowledge as well as decide on 
which activities to support and prioritise. The agendas for these meetings, are set by 
the facilitator. So far, the facilitators have solely been state actors including the US 
(twice), France, Germany, Canada and the EU (current facilitator). The meetings, usually 
take place in the Congo Basin6. The current facilitator aims to strengthen Central 
African Forests Commission (COMIFAC) in order to give them leadership of the CBFP 
from 2018 onwards. 
Mode of operation 
CBFP takes on a role of facilitation, networking and information sharing between 
donors and actors engaged with project-implementation. Although actual 
implementation or funding of projects is not carried out directly by the CBFP, some of 
its partners manage their own programs and projects irrespectively. One of these 
partners is the COMIFAC, with which the CBFP also collaborates closely to achieve its 
overarching goals of promoting conservation and sustainable management while 
improving living standards in the Congo Basin7. This is evident by the CBFPs 
commitment to COMIFACs convergence plan as a key component in their Cooperation 
Framework8. Together, this entails that CBFP’s directly stated objective to govern 
biodiversity is manifested only indirectly by actors operating external to the 
institution. This also makes it difficult to identify the exact role and performance of 
CBPF’s operation in achieving potential outcomes. 
Output and performance 
CBFP is an active partnership, as seen by the continuous updates and briefings on their 
website. There are, however, no available reports estimating the partnership’s 
performance in terms of outcomes and potential impacts, for instance through 
contributions to project facilitation. Links are provided to key partners such as the 
COMIFAC, that manage several projects relevant to biodiversity and forest governance. 
                                               
5
  CBPF 2016a: http://pfbc-cbfp.org/workingstructure.html 
6
  CBFP 2016b: http://pfbc-cbfp.org/proceedings/items/EU-Cooperation-framework-en.html 
7
  CBFP 2016c: http://pfbc-cbfp.org/objectifs_en.html 
8
  CBFP 2016d: http://pfbc-cbfp.org/facilitation_en.html  
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However, it is not possible to pinpoint the CBFP’s role in contribution to such projects. 
Despite several clearly articulated steps to improve the institution and its 
performance9, there are no information available and no signs of a reporting structure 
where potential successes can be measured and communicated  
MRV 
CBFP’s cooperation framework states that an advisory committee is tasked with 
continuous monitoring of activities conducted within the partnership. However, there 
are no mention of reporting and/or verification of such activities. Additionally, 
potential findings from monitoring of activities are not made publicly available. There 
is no verification procedure. 
Final remarks 
The CBFP is an active facilitator and platform in the field of forest and biodiversity 
governance as well as sustainable development and management. Although the 
partnership functions without a central administration they have a clear and 
transparent governance structure and are currently working towards establishing a 
more permanent leadership. The ongoing facilitator, the EU has set promising goals to 
further concretise the partnership’s role and to clarify its contributions10. 
An abundance of documents related to the partnership’s structure and objectives are 
publicly available, however reports on activities and achievements are missing. This 
makes it difficult to assess the partnership’s performance. Although CBFP does not 
engage in direct implementation of projects or financing, it would be useful to have an 
overview of the projects in which the partnership is/has been involved. The ongoing 
transition towards a more stable administration by a single actor, the COMIFAC, could 
potentially increase the CBFP’s focus since the agenda setting will not change every 
two years.  
Finally, in a recently released letter leading up to the upcoming annual meeting the EU 
encourage CBFP members to consider the added value of the partnership11. It is 
recommendable that such considerations are also clearly communicated to the public 
as this would significantly improve the understanding of the partnership.  
  
                                               
9  Ibid, 
10  CBFeP 2016d: http://pfbc-cbfp.org/facilitation_en.html. 
11  CBFP 2016e: http://pfbc-cbfp.org/proceedings/items/EU-Cooperation-framework-en.html  
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4.2.2 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) 
Start year 2008 




Monitoring and evaluation framework in place and publicly reported. No 
verification procedure in. 
Output 
Yes. Publish annual reports. Provide REDD+ assistance and funding. 
Several projects are under development. 
Performance 
Clear outcomes. Several projects are underway, and several objectives 
fulfilled. Biodiversity impacts are not clear and will only manifest over 
time.  
 
Background and objective 
The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is a multi-stakeholder partnership and 
funding initiative. It was designed by the World Bank and The Nature Conservancy and 
initiated in 2008. Its primary goal is to support REDD+ activities by: 
“[Providing] incentives to reduce emissions while protecting forests, conserving 
biodiversity, and enhancing the livelihoods of forest-dependent Indigenous Peoples 
and local communities.”12 
Currently FCPF try to meet this objective across 47 developing countries13. This is done 
through two separate but mutually dependent funding mechanisms, the Readiness 
Fund and the Carbon Fund. Both are fuelled by donations from state and non-state 
actors including OECD governments, The Nature Conservancy and BP Technology 
Ventures Inc. In total the partnership has raised over $1 billion across the two funds.  
Biodiversity governance 
Membership and participation 
Two groups of participants make up the FCPF14: 1) REDD+ Country Participants (47 
countries from tropical and subtropical regions), 2) Financial Contributors (17 public 
and private actors contributing to the two funds). Together the 64 members constitute 
the decision-making body of the FCPF in form of a Participants Assembly (PA) and a 
Participants Committee (PC).  
The former elects the latter on an annual basis. The PC reviews countries’ REDD+ 
submissions and decides on grants and resource allocation. Aside from the governing 
members, all the meetings as well as related documents are open to observers 
consisting of NGOs, forest-dependent indigenous people and forest dwellers15. 
                                               
12
  FCPF 2013a: 
https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/fcp/files/2013/june2013/Carbon%20Fund-
web_1.pdf (pp. 3) 
13
  FCPF 2016a: https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/redd-country-participants 
14
  Ibid. 
15
  FCPF 2016b: https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/charter-and-governance-documents 
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On the level of implementation, 2 of 19 large projects ongoing in 2016 directly 
account for and include indigenous people inhabiting the land proposed for the 
projects and 10 projects aim to collaborate with local stakeholders and communities16. 
Mode of operation 
REDD+ countries have to take the initiative to partake in the FCPC by submitting a 
Readiness Plan Idea Note17. 
Biodiversity is governed directly through the FCPF’s Carbon Fund, which focus on 
implementing a system where developing countries are paid for verified emissions 
achieved through REDD+ activities. This is supposed to incentivise sustainable 
management and protection of forests as well as conservation of biodiversity, for 
instance by valuing untouched forest higher that the value it is worth once logged18. 
Although the readiness fund does not directly contribute to biodiversity governance, it 
plays an important factor in providing a foundation by helping applicant countries to 
successfully develop and conduct REDD+ activities. In order to qualify for the Carbon 
Fund, a country first has to make tangible progress through the Readiness Program, 
for instance by designing action plans and MRV frameworks. 
Output and performance 
From the outset, the FCPF publishes annual progress reports outlining their activities 
and, from 2013 onwards, including chapters on achievements in terms of outputs, 
outcomes and impacts19. The FCPF states four key objectives in its charter: 1) To assist 
REDD+ countries in their implementation efforts, 2) to pilot a performance based 
payment to emission reduction system, 3) to test ways to sustain livelihoods and 
conserve biodiversity under the REDD+ agenda and 4) to disseminate broadly the 
knowledge gained through the partnership development and its efforts through the 
Readiness Fund and Carbon Fund20. Looking at the 2016 Annual Report, these 
objectives are evaluated in turn: 
1. In 2016 eight new REDD+ Emission Reductions–Program Idea Notes were included 
into the FCFP Carbon Fund. This means that large-scale programs across 19 
developing countries are in place (FCPF 2016e). By 2016 the Readiness Fund 
reached a capital capacity for REDD+ assistance of $370 million and the Carbon 
Fund a capital of $750 million. 
2. The payment scheme is yet to be piloted, but the 2016 was the year when the first 
two countries advanced to present their Emission Reductions Program Documents. 
This is the essential step before to initiating large-scale carbon transactions and 
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signing an Emission Reductions Payment Agreement. FCPF expects that this will 
happen for the first time in the financial year of 201721. 
3. Two of the current 19 projects, one in Madagascar and one in Democratic Republic 
of Congo, directly aim to protect or conserve biodiversity and the project in 
Dominican Republic include protection of endemic flora and fauna22. The 
programs cover more than 80 million hectares of which at least 40 million 
hectares are in species rich areas including tropical and temperate forests in 
Western African and South America. Further specific outcomes include the change 
of Nepalese legislation to ensure equitable benefit and sharing of the benefits 
from conservation and management of forest, pant resources and biodiversity23. 
4. Judging by the annual reports and the level of information provided by the FCPF in 
general, it seems that the organisation is doing well to record, inform and critically 
reflect on their projects, progress and performance24. 
MRV 
In 2013 the FCPF implemented a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework. It was 
developed specifically for the period 2013-2020 and focus primarily on monitoring and 
reporting the effectiveness and efficiency of program delivery25. Additionally, the 
framework includes very clear matrices and frameworks for measuring and reporting 
objectives, outputs and expected impacts on a program basis as well as the 
overarching FCPF structure26. The framework does not contain any clauses for a 
verification mechanism. 
An additional checking procedure is implemented through the World Bank who works 
to ensure that the FCPF operations comply with applicable policies related to 
safeguards, procurement and financial management27. 
Final remarks 
FCPF has already been recognised as a major proponent in aiding the preparation 
developing countries’ Readiness Preparation Proposals (R-PP) as well as providing 
funding of REDD+ projects (Pirard and Belna 2012, Kabiri 2016). Looking at the 
projects they have supported it is clear that aspects such as sustainable management, 
equitable sharing of benefits as well as biodiversity protection is given much attention. 
An examination of the FCPF’s annual reports provides a good overview of outcomes 
from their projects. However, as potential biodiversity impacts will only become 
apparent over longer time, it is too early to say whether the programmes will be 
successful in reaching their overarching objectives. Particularly because the project 
details provided to the public are too vague to determine exactly where protection will 
take place and to what extent. Furthermore, it is unclear what sustainable 
management entails in practice for the regional biodiversity. 
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The internal M&E framework is suitable for the current status of the program. Meaning 
that the most important aspects at this stage if for the FCPF itself to ensure that 
programs as well as the facility itself are proceeding according to plan. However, once 
the projects enter into implementation, it would be beneficial to develop an external 
verification procedure to ensure that the promised targets are actually achieved. This 
will contribute better information to policymakers and the public, as well as increase 
the transparency and legitimacy of FCPF as an institution. Finally, aside from the 
informative annual reports, it would benefit the information flow if more detailed 
information on the individual projects were published through the FCPF’s website. 
4.2.3 The Global Partnership on Forest Landscape Restoration (GPFLR)  
Start year 2003 
Membership type Hybrid: Public and CSO actors have governing capacity. 
Members 36 
Website http://www.forestlandscaperestoration.org/  
MRV 
Individual members all have monitoring and reporting frameworks in place. 
Progress reports are made public. Monitor and reporting network in place 
for information sharing. A lot of public information. No verification 
procedure. 
Output 
Some. Continuous updates and public information through learning 
platform is available. 
Performance No clear outcomes or impacts. 
 
Background and objective 
Hosted by IUCN, the Global Partnership on Forest Landscape Restoration (GPFLR) was 
launched in 2003 as a platform for development and forest restoration. It was initially 
established by IUCN, WWF and the Forestry Commission of Great Britain and has since 
been joined by 25 governments, IOs and NGOs. The GPFLR positions itself as a 
“leading network for forest and landscape restoration practitioners and policy-
makers.”28 
The GPFLR is a learning network, in which a range of different organisations share 
knowledge pertaining to the restoration of degraded forests and landscapes. The 
network is proactive in collecting and disseminating information among its members. 
The key objective of the GPFLR is to unite “governments, organisations, communities 
and individuals with a common goal: restoring the world’s degraded and deforested 
lands.”29 
Biodiversity governance 
Membership and participation 
The GPFLR has 36 members including governments to IOs, NGOs and research 
institutes. The members of the partnership contribute by sharing their expertise, 
policies and projects. The GPFLR is also used by its members to identify issue areas 
and allocate funding30. As a member of the GPFLR, one can access all the latest 
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research, forest restoration tools, and policy information collected through the 
member organisations and shared on the GPFLR learning website31.  
The partnership’s activities are guided by a small group of representatives from some 
of the most active members. In addition to this group, which can be considered the 
GPFLR board, a secretariat is hosted by IUCN and learning support is provided by 
Wageningen Centre for Development Innovation from the Netherlands32. More 
information on the governance structure is not provided by the GPFLR. It is unclear 
how the board is chosen, whether they rotate and what role the remaining members 
have. 
Mode of operation 
GPFLR can be seen as a knowledge sharing agent. It collects best practices and case 
study examples from its members’ projects to “catalys[e] and reinforce[e] a network of 
diverse examples of restoration of forests and degraded lands that deliver benefits to 
local communities and to nature, and fulfil international commitments on forests.”33 
The GPFLR works through so-called learning sites, which are used to link international 
agendas on forest restoration to local restoration practices and vice versa (Pistorius 
and Freiberg 2014).  
The overarching approach of the GPFLR members is described as Forest Landscape 
Restoration (FLP), acknowledging the multiple functions of a landscape. This is a 
holistic approach to landscape restoration which goes beyond commitments to tree 
cover maximisation and instead seeks to optimise existing ecosystem service benefits 
and social livelihoods within a landscape. This way the goal of an FLR approach is not 
only to restore the landscape’s forest to its original state, but also to fulfil the needs of 
all stakeholders involved, balancing people and the environment34.  
One of GPFLR’s key-activities is its support for the Bonn Challenge: a high-level 
commitment issued by IUCN and the German government and the result of an event 
organised in Bonn in 2011 attended by world leaders. Essentially, it’s a global 
commitment to restore 150 million hectares of all degraded and deforested lands by 
2020 and up to 350 million hectares by 2030. The target was later endorsed in the 
New York Declaration on Forests of the 2014 UN Climate Summit. The Bonn challenge 
directly links to other commitments codified in for example the CBD, UNFCCC REDD+ 
and the Rio+20 (Pistorius and Freiberg 2014). GPFLR supports the institution by 
disseminating the necessary knowledge and tools to achieve the target.  
Output and performance 
It is difficult to trace the performance of the GPFLR to date as it does not publish any 
progress or assessment reports. The institution does, however, have clear outputs 
through its learning sites, where it provides links to reports published by its member 
organisations, most notably IUCN. While the member organisations’ reports are 
detailed and rigorously done, it is not possible to pinpoint the role of the GPFLR in 
these achievements. The website of the Bonn challenge keeps track of how much 
forest has been restored to date, but, again, the specific role of the GPFLR in these 
achievements remains unclear, as the role of the GPFLR is limited to learning 
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support35. However, continuous updates on new information and its learning sites, 
listed both on their main website and learning website, indicate that the GPFLR is an 
active partnership. 
MRV 
Each of the GPFLR member organisations have a clear monitoring and reporting 
framework attached to the projects they conduct. Additionally, the GPFLR has a clear 
monitoring and reporting network meant to facilitate knowledge transfer and 
learning36. They publish case study reports of projects where Forest and landscape 
restoration is being or has been implemented. No mention of a verification procedure 
is made. 
Final remarks 
The GPFLR is an active global partnership with representatives of large organisations 
such as IUCN, FAO the World Bank and governments representatives amongst its 
members. It continuously updates its learning network to connect existing projects, 
policies and implementation tools on forest restoration. The Bonn challenge is one of 
its key commitments and is largely used as a guidance mechanism by its member 
organisations. The overarching approach of the GPFLR is the integrated Forest 
Landscape Restoration approach, holistically combining efforts to forest restoration 
with livelihood improvements.  
GPFLR’s performance related to biodiversity and its goal on forest restoration is 
unclear. This is largely due to a lack of specific reporting by the GPFLR itself. In 
addition. while the GPFLR describes itself as a proactive learning network, it remains a 
passive agent that is not involved in implementing projects itself. 
In order to assess the contribution and effectiveness of the GPFLR as a learning 
network, it would be advisable that they publish biennial or annual achievement 
reports that list projects in which the GPFLR has been directly involved and how their 
involvement has led to measured impact (i.e. causal attribution). Additionally, the 
GPFLR could improve its transparency. Information regarding its governance structure 
is particularly sparse, e.g. how chairs are chosen and whether other members of the 
partnership will get a chance to host chairmanship. 
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4.2.4 Sustainable Food Systems Programme (SFSP) 
Start year 2015 





MRV Monitoring and reporting in place and made public. No verification procedure. 
Output Yes. Some structural outputs. 
Performance No clear outcomes or impacts. 
 
Background and objective 
The Sustainable Food Systems Programme (SFSP) is a multi-stakeholder initiative 
established under the 10-year Framework for Programmes on Sustainable 
Consumption and Production Patterns (10YFP) in 201537.  
The vision of the SFSP is that all food systems should sustainably provide food security 
and nutrition for current and future generations. In line with their vision, the goal of 
the SFSP is to “accelerate the shift towards more sustainable food systems,” which it 
seeks to reach through four activities: Awareness raising, capacity building, increasing 
access to information and tools, and building synergies and cooperation38.  
The 10YFP, of which the SFSP is part, is a global action framework with the overarching 
goal of promoting, accelerating and upscaling shifts towards more sustainable 
consumption and production practices39. The 10YFP was an outcome of the Rio+20 
and adopted by heads of state in June 2012 (A/CONF.216/5, paragraph 226, “The 
Future We Want.”40). Examples of other programmes under the 10YFP are the 
Sustainable lifestyles and education programme, the sustainable buildings and 
construction programme and the sustainable public procurement programme. UNEP 
hosts a secretariat for the 10YFP and the SFSP41.  
Biodiversity governance 
Membership and participation 
In the 10YFP programme, over 500 stakeholders are involved spanning governments, 
private sector organisations, CSOs and UN bodies. 10YFP consists of a 10-member 
board whose members are elected for a two-year term after nomination by their 
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regional groups42. To fulfil the functions of the 10YFP and administer the Trust Fund, a 
secretariat is hosted by UNEP.  
The SFSP itself is governed by a Multi-Stakeholder Advisory Committee (MAC). The 
MAC consists of 22 members including government agencies, CSOs, research 
institutions, UN agencies and private sector organisations. The MAC is led by the 
Department for Trade and Industry of South Africa, the Federal Office for Agriculture of 
Switserland, Hivos, and the WWF. They were nominated and officially elected during 
the SFSP’s Kick-off Event. There is no mention of potential co-lead rotations or of 
further nomination processes43. The MAC meets regularly either through 
teleconferences or face-to face, with the next meeting taking place in June 2017. All 
organisations interested in joining the 10YFP Programme can do so by submitting an 
application form through the UNEP 10YFP website44.  
Mode of operation 
The SFSP continues the work done by the FAO-UNEP Sustainable Food Systems 
Programme. It operates according to four goals in line with their objectives. It takes on 
a facilitating role in multi-stakeholder dialogues to inform policy-makers and promote 
investments and participation in sustainable food systems.  
The Programme acknowledges the importance of biodiversity conservation and 
restoration in order to create sustainable food systems and mentions that there is a 
clear relationship between the two. However, while biodiversity is implicitly referred to 
as a part of SFSP’s aim to contribute to operating within planetary boundaries, its main 
area of focus is social systems45. Additionally, no outline is provided as to how their 
activities will help govern biodiversity. The only direct mention of practical activities 
related to biodiversity is in the programme proposal, which aims at “developing and 
implementing monitoring tools to evaluate the impact of food systems on 
sustainability aspects, e.g. biodiversity”46.  
Output and performance 
The SFSP is still in the start-up phase and no concrete outcomes are yet visible. 
However, the Programme does have some outputs through developing a coherent work 
structure, concrete objectives and work plans as well as an upstarting project. 
Thus far, the SFSP has had several events, mostly meetings of the MAC. From these 
meetings, summary reports are published listing main discussion points, outcomes 
and decisions. In addition to several in-depth discussions on the programme’s 
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progress to date and next steps, the MAC agreed on five emerging cross-cutting 
themes, as well as two broad categories of projects47.  
In addition, the most recent SFSP’s newsletter confirms that the Programme is 
currently developing a M&E framework, resource mobilisation strategy and a 
communication strategy. Finally, the first affiliated project of the SFSP was adopted 
called MyFoodSkills: an online knowledge-sharing platform. Finally, a Trust Fund call 
for proposals to the SFSP was made and subsequently launched48.  
MRV 
Progress report for 10YFP in general are prepared by the UN secretariat and the most 
recent 10YFP progress report published can be seen as monitoring and reporting for 
the SFSP too49. However, no specific SFSP progress reports have been published to 
date. 
The summary report of the November 2016 MAC meeting states that the 10YFP 
secretariat is currently developing a monitoring and evaluation framework that 
includes “both indicators to monitor the 10YFP overall” and also aims to evaluate the 
progress of the six 10YFP constituent programmes, including the SFSP50. In that, M&R 
is likely to take place in a similar fashion to the other programmes under 10YFP. There 
is no indication of a verification system. 
Final remarks 
Currently, the SFSP is still in the early stages of development. Nevertheless, there are 
clear indications that the programme is growing and moving towards implementation. 
Since the November MAC meeting, for example, more programme partners were 
adopted, the commitment to developing a M&E system was made, and tentative dates 
for future MAC teleconferences and face-to-face meetings were set. 
While biodiversity play a part in the overarching aim of the institution, it is unclear how 
exactly the SFSP hopes to contribute directly to biodiversity governance and how they 
aim to steer their activities towards harmonising food systems with biodiversity and 
ecosystem management in general. However, given that the institution is still in its 
infancy this lack of information does not necessarily indicate negligence of biodiversity 
as a feature in their activities. 
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4.2.5 Global G.A.P (GGAP) 
Start year 1997 
Membership type Private: Include only firm actors. 
Members 247 
Website http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/ 
MRV Full MRV framework in place. 
Output Yes. 16 certification standards have been designed and implemented. 
Performance 
Clear outcomes through certification. Biodiversity impacts are not 
clear. 
 
Background and objective 
The GlobalG.A.P. (GGAP) standard was founded as EUREPGAP by European retailers 
from the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group in 1997. One of its key objectives was 
to pioneer an Europe-wide harmonised scheme with standardised agricultural practice 
standards (Kalfagianni and Fuchs 2012). By 2007 the name GlobalG.A.P. was adopted 
due to increased global participation51. 
The focal point of the institution is its certification scheme, and the key objective of 
this is to achieve: “Safe and sustainable agricultural production to benefit farmers, 
retailers and consumers throughout the world.”52 Finally, GlobalG.A.P. states that their 
certification covers several issues including food safety, workers’ health, animal 
welfare and the “environment (including biodiversity)”53. As GlobalG.A.P. is a large and 
complex system with several intertwined aspects to it, the following outline will focus 
primarily on the certification segment as this is the main component in their stated 
biodiversity governance. 
Biodiversity governance  
Membership and participation 
GlobalG.A.P. is currently governed by a board of elected retailer and producer 
representatives from Belgium, Costa Rica, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom. A 
new election procedure is initiated every 4 years and candidacy is open to all retailer 
and supplier members54. Aside from the board there is a secretariat in place that, 
within the framework of board resolutions, manages three committees on 
benchmarking, certification and integrity surveillance. A group of technical committees 
are working under direction of the board to design the GlobalG.A.P. standards. 
Participation in the certification is voluntary and essentially open to any producers 
wishing to partake. 
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Mode of operation 
The certification covers three scopes of production: Crops, aquaculture, and livestock. 
Within these scopes, they offer 16 standards for issues such as feed-manufacturing, 
livestock transportation and crop production. The mode of operation is simple. The 
certification process is open to all. Once acquired, the certification lasts for one year. 
This ensures that the impact of the standard is achieved for as long as the certification 
is upheld.  
The certification process has five steps55: 1) Acquire the relevant Standard Document 
Checklist. 2) Find a third-party certification body in your country approved by the 
GlobalG.A.P., these can be found through GlobalG.A.P.’s website. 3) Carry out self-
assessment following the relevant standard. 4) Certification body will send an 
inspector to verify compliance. 5) Once compliance is successful certification is 
awarded for a 1-year period. 
Output and performance 
The GlobalG.A.P. has clear outputs through its 16 farm-based standards (crops, 
livestock and aquaculture), which all include the same general clauses relevant to 
biodiversity governance56. Additionally, as it is a certification standards with 
appropriate third party verification, it is possible to gauge potential impacts by looking 
at what the standard covers together with the number of certifications awarded, the 
areas they cover and how long time they are maintained.  
The standard for all farm based practices requires that the farmers have an action plan 
to enhance habitats and maintain biodiversity within the farm’s area. Additionally, 
special attention should be paid to areas of environmental interest, and the plan 
should include knowledge on pest management, water supply and conservation sites. 
More steps are listed as recommended, but are not requisites to achieve certification.  
In GlobalG.A.P’s annual reports, measures are given regarding the coverage of the 
certification across the different sectors57. These are also compared across the 
previous five years enabling time-wise comparison. Regarding crop-certification the 
GlobalG.A.P. also specify where in the world they certify and how much they certify 
across regions. 
In 2015, 160,452 producers worldwide were certified by the Global.G.A.P’s Integrated 
Farm Assurance, an increase from 106,008 in 201058. The covered area is 
approximately 3.2 million hectares. Europe is still the standard’s key market, with 
65.4% of the certified parties located here. South America has 11.7%, Africa 11.2%, 
Asia 9.3%, North America 1.4% and Oceania 0.9% of all the certified producers. 
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MRV 
The GlobalG.A.P.’s MRV framework is of a very high standard. It includes clear and 
thorough guidelines and requirements for the different standards. It has strong 
monitoring and reporting elements as well as third party verification carried out by 
certifying bodies across the globe. A strong MRV is important to maintain legitimacy 
for a certification scheme such as the GlobalG.A.P. as potential impacts of certification 
are directly linked to ensuring that the certified actors adhere to the standards. Finally, 
GlobalG.A.P. publishes online all relevant documents and reports including clear 
explanations of governance structure, charters, continuous news briefs, standards and 
assessment matrices for all relevant sectors as well as annual progress reports.  
Final remarks 
Tey et al. (2016) find GlobalG.A.P. to be an exemplar standard. Looking at their MRV 
framework as well as the inclusive organisational structure there are not many 
improvements to be made. However, as noted by several authors such as Henson, 
Masakure, and Cranfield (2011) and Subervie and Vagneron (2013), there are some 
implications related to this same robust framework. These are mainly that compliance 
with the standards is costly due to extensive certification process. Both studies, 
conducted in separate regions, found that farmers and producers were willing to 
engage as long as they received financial support from donors or interested exporters. 
However, as soon as the funds stopped, the incentive to partake disappeared. 
Although, this is not an issue unique to GlobalG.A.P.’s certification, it is an issue 
deserving attention, for instance by providing clear structures for financial and 
technical support. 
Additionally, even though GlobalG.A.P. provides a robust standard, the particular 
clauses regarding governance of biodiversity and related issues such as sustainable 
use or conservation of forest and species are limited. Also, the weighting of these 
clauses is either marked as “minor must” or “recommended”59.  
Finally looking at the 2016 Annual Report it is clear that that the GlobalG.A.P. mainly 
certify producers in Europe60. Whereas this is not per say a bad indicator for a 
standard, it does mean that areas of high significance to biodiversity (see e.g. Miller 
and Spoolman 2012, 243) are less in the scope of this particular certification scheme.  
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4.2.6 The Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials (RSB) 
Start year 2007 
Membership type Hybrid: Public, CSO and firm actors have governing capacity. 
Members 80 
Website http://rsb.org/ 
MRV Full MRV framework in place and information reported publicly. 
Output Yes. Several certification standards. 
Performance 
Clear outcomes through implementation of certification. Biodiversity 
impacts are unclear. 
 
Background and objective 
Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials (RSB), previously known as Roundtable on 
Sustainable Biofuels, is a multi-stakeholder initiative aiming to: 
“Provide and promote [a] global standard for socially, environmentally and 
economically sustainable production and conversion of biomass. Provide a global 
platform for multi-stakeholder dialogue and consensus building. Ensure that users and 
producers have access to credible, practical and affordable certification.61” 
The institution was founded in 2007 and has since then attracted attention as a high-
profile standard (Fortin 2013). It is not merely employed in its own right, but further 
used by for instance the EU as the standard of choice to ensure producers’ compliance 
with the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive (Fortin 2013). Next to RSB’s main global 
standard, several certification standards, e.g. for non-energy producers and for 
smallholder certification, are in place. This analysis focus primarily on the RSB’s global 
standard as the others are additions to or modifications hereof. 
Biodiversity governance 
Membership and participation 
RSB is a multi-stakeholder certification scheme meaning that all its members have 
governing capacity through access to the Assembly of Delegates. Members are divided 
into seven chambers: 1) Biomass producers, 2) Biofuel and biomaterial producers, 3) 
Retailers, user and investors, 4) Trade unions and rights-based NGOs, 5) Social 
development NGOs, 6) Environmental NGOs and 7) Government and research62. Each 
of these chambers are represented in the Assembly of Delegates who is in charge of 
appointing the board of directors, approving standards as well as other administrative 
tasks63. Additionally, the RSB includes stakeholders from all these groups in the design 
process of its standards and certification procedures.  
Participation to RSB is open to any organisation whose work or production is relevant 
to the production or use of biomaterials64. 
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Mode of operation 
The RSB certification is founded around twelve principles/focal points: Legality, 
Planning and monitoring, Greenhouse gas emissions, Human and labour rights, Rural 
and social development, Local food security, Conservation, Soil, Water, Air quality, 
Technology inputs and waste as well as Land rights65. 
To be certified RSB an operator follows a three-step procedure. First, the operator 
decides what type of standard to apply for, and send in an application though an 
online application portal. In this step, the costs of certification are also determined 
using a free calculation tool. The price varies largely depend on type and size of 
operation. For small agricultural producers (<150ha) the price is only $50, whereas for 
large farms (>1000ha) it can be as much as $2,000 depending on production type. For 
industrial companies, prices can reach up against $20,00066. Step two is audit 
preparation. Two certification bodies have been approved by Accreditation Services 
International (ASI) to certify the RSB standard. Once one of these have been ordered 
the operator has to prepare for the audit by showing adherence to the relevant RSB 
standard. To aid in this process, the RSB provides several online tools as well as a 
special advisory service67. Finally, in step three, the auditor will review the filed 
information and arrange field trips to a selected sample of the operator’s locations to 
verify its validity. If major issues are identified, these have to be solved before 
certification can be awarded. In case of minor issues, they simply have to be solved 
before the next audit. Depending on an operator’s risk rating audits have to be 
conducted annually or biennially68. 
In addition to the general standards operation, the RSB launched a Smallholder 
Program in 2013. The program tries to tackle issues commonly faced by smallholder 
farmers such as limited access to technology, limited market access, high certification 
costs and inadequate social and financial incentive to participate in certification 
schemes69. 
Output and performance 
By developing and implementing several standards and programs the RSB has clear 
outputs relevant to biodiversity. Looking at some of RSB’s twelve principles it is 
possible to assess what kind of outcomes and potential future impacts RSB certified 
products have in relation to biodiversity governance. Of largest direct relevance is the 
principle of conservation70. Other principles have indirect relevance such as water, land 
rights and GHG emission. The principle of conservation, the only one addressed 
further, broadly entails that: 
a. Operators shall identify conservation values on the certified land and that they 
always prioritise areas of lowest values in their production. 
b. Ecosystem functions directly affected by the operator shall be maintained or 
enhanced. 
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  RSB 2016e: http://www.rsb.org/pdfs/documents_and_resources/PandCs%20Brochure.pdf 
66  RSB 2016b: 
http://rsb.org/pdfs/documents_and_resources/RSB%20Certification%20Guide.pdf 
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c. Operations shall protect, restore or create buffer zones. 
d. Ecological corridors have to be protected, restored or created to minimise habitat 
fragmentation. 
e. Invasive species shall be prevented from entering operation sites. 
It is possible to assume that these activities are upheld for operational areas that have 
been certified. However, without detailed knowledge of the areas size, location, fauna, 
etc. it is impossible to give more specialised account of RSB’s outcomes in relation to 
direct biodiversity conservation. 
RSB’s impact/output report published in 2015 contains transparent objective and 
achievements over the two-year period 2012-201471. By the end of 2014 RSB had 
certified 17 companies representing 23 operations across 14 countries. Their target 
was to reach an uptake of 30 operators. The only number available on area covered by 
the RSB standard is for feedstock production, which covered just over 20 thousand 
hectares by the end of 2014. RSB reports that, looking at the land covered by its 
standard, it can be extrapolated that a similar amount of land adheres to the above-
mentioned conservation standards72. Finally, approximately 390Gt RSB certified 
biofuels were produced in the two-year period. It is not informed what this is 
equivalent to in terms of area covered. 
MRV 
RSB has a state of the art MRV framework in place. In fact, it has several. On the base-
level, third party certifying bodies are employed, regularly ensuring that participants 
adhere to the RSB’s standards. On the level above is the ISA verifying that the certifying 
bodies do their job correctly. Finally, the RSB is a full member of the ISEAL Alliance, 
which essentially serves as a meta-governance body for standards who seeks to ensure 
accountability, transparency, effectiveness and credibility of standards world-wide 
(Paiement 2016). In this way ISEAL adds to the legitimacy of standards and certification 
schemes (Loconto and Fouilleux 2014). 
Additionally, RSB releases bimonthly newsletters with updates on upcoming events, 
new projects and the progress within the organisation73. Finally, RSB publishes an 
annual Monitoring and evaluations (M&E) reports, providing general trends in terms of 
their global performances74.  
Final remarks 
Authors such as Subervie and Vagneron (2013) and Ruysschaert and Salles (2014) have 
identified several shortcomings pertaining to certification systems like the RSB. These 
include lacking financial compensation, too large room for interpretation, lack of 
effective external control and a failure to integrate the standards properly into national 
socio-politico-legal frameworks. Looking at the RSB in compared to these common 
issues one will notice that the standard is doing very well. 
First, RSB has a clear system in place to alleviate issues regarding financial 
compensation to less wealthy participants, particularly smallholder farmers. A program 
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that simultaneously seek to increase their incentive to join the certification as well as 
aid them technologically. Looking at the RSB’s M&E report one can see that, despite 
the Smallholder Program, the level of smallholder implementation still not as high as 
the organisation aimed at. However, the RSB is working on improving this further. 
In terms on interpretation of the standard two things deserve attention. Firstly, the RSB 
have a state of the art verification system in place to ensure adequate compliance with 
the standards. Secondly, the RSB standards are very clear and easy to follow and all 
include with several minimum requirements that operators need to follow. 
Additionally, to achieve RSB certification, as opposed to other certification schemes, all 
criteria have to be upheld (Fortin and Richardson 2013). Although it is not possible to 
gauge exactly how much the operators do in case they exceed the minimum standard 
requirements, the standard provides a strong conservative estimate of what the 
standard entails in terms of potential impact across the twelve principle areas. 
Due to the low level of implementation in the period for which the RSB has assessed its 
outcomes, it is difficult to provide more detailed information regarding the 
organisation’s performance to biodiversity governance. However, in terms of 
transparency, MRV as well as the institution’s efforts to promote its standard to both 
large and small operators, the RSB can be considered a front-runner in its field. Also, 
considering their main objective stated above, they are doing well towards achieving 
their goals. This is likely also why international organisations such as the IUCN, 
governmental institutions such as the EC and NGOs like WWF recognise the RSB as the 
most comprehensive and ambitious standards and certification scheme in the field75 
(Fortin 2013). 
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4.2.7 Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform (SAI) 
Start year  2010 
Membership type Private: Only firm actors have governing capacity. 
Members 75 
Website http://www.saiplatform.org/about-us/who-we-are  
MRV 
Monitoring and reporting in place. Several reports are publicly available. 
No verification procedure. 
Output 
Yes. Developed and publicised several protocols for sustainable 
management. 
Performance 
Clear outcomes, several members have adopted reporting procedures. 
No clear biodiversity impacts. 
 
Background and objective 
The Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform (SAI) is a voluntary private initiative 
founded by Nestlé, Unilever and Danone in 2002 as a mean to share knowledge and 
best practices regarding sustainable agriculture across the food value chain76. The 
platforms definition of sustainable agriculture is:  
“The efficient production of safe, high quality agricultural products, in a way that 
protects and improves the natural environment, the social and economic conditions of 
farmers, their employees and local communities, and safeguards the health and 
welfare of all farmed species.”77 
The environmental segment of SAI’s sustainability definition focus on soil fertility, 
water, energy and biodiversity78. 
Biodiversity governance 
Membership and participation 
SAI’s is made up of 75 active members, all companies from the food industry. Every 
two years a new executive committee is elected during the General Assembly. An 
advisory council, made up of six representatives from NGOs, farmers organisations 
and research institutes, is in place to provide critical advice on developments related to 
sustainable agriculture79. Finally, the working groups in individual segments are made 
up of members to whom the covered issues are relevant. Implementation of best 
practices and protocols on the farm level work partly through Farmer Self-Assessment, 
developed in 2014, and partly through ongoing projects initiated by SAI80. It is the 
responsibility of the SAI members to communicate such practices to the farmers in 
their supply chains, but it is unclear how this is done. 
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Mode of operation 
SAI activities are focussed on two main areas, to 1) build capacity of sustainable 
agriculture and 2) communicate about sustainable agriculture. The former includes the 
development of principles, tools and best practices through research, testing these in 
pilot schemes across the globe and developing a Sustainability Performance 
Assessment tool. The second aspect involve communicating findings and results to the 
public, hold annual conferences and providing different training programs81. 
Development of best practices and activities are divided across five segments: Beef, 
dairy, arable and vegetable crops, coffee and fruit. For all working areas, except beef, 
sets of principles and best practices have been developed. Of highest relevance to 
biodiversity are the practices and principles developed in regards to crops, fruit and 
coffee82. Additionally, the SAI has working groups in charge of the different segments, 
assigned to help farmers use tools and implement practices as well as organise and 
run projects. 
Aside from these working areas, the SAI has set up a committee focusing entirely on 
biodiversity and ecosystem services. This committee helps participants find answers to 
biodiversity related questions, e.g. how to identify and evaluate risks, how to manage 
or mitigate risks and what companies are expected to do83. 
In 2015 SAI implemented a Farm Sustainability Assessment (FSA) Committee 
responsible for steering activities related to FSA, including creating benchmark-
methodologies, approving benchmarking of standards, engaging with standard owners 
as well as verification and integrity84. 
Output and performance 
SAI is an active and informative platform. Looking at the 2015 annual report in light of 
the two targets related to knowledge creation and dissemination, the platform has 
produced relevant outputs85. It has researched, developed and published clear 
protocols and best practices for four out of five key issues areas, all containing clear 
recommendations related to sustainable management and biodiversity.  
Furthermore, SAI is continuously trying to improve its facilities and activities to better 
help members implement practices and standards across their supply chains. This is 
for instance done through conducting workshops related to communication between 
the food companies and the farmers that supply them. 
As a proxy of SAI’s success rate in disseminating their best practices, 76% of their 
members have developed a strategy for sustainable sourcing of agricultural raw 
materials. 44% have set specific targets for some or all of the agricultural products 
they source and 75% of these have made their targets public86. 
These targets and standards are seemingly translated to the farm level through self-
assessment, but it is unclear how exactly this works and to what extent. However, one 
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of the current goals of the SAI is to improve the communicative link between the food 
industry and the farmers87. 
MRV 
One of the roles of the advisory board is to evaluate the work and progress of the 
platform. Additionally, members are encouraged, but not required, to report annually 
on their activities related to developing sustainable agriculture practices88. Finally, 
annual reports are published to inform on new actions as well as the general 
development of the platform. An online library provide access to information on all 
protocols, principles, projects, news and relevant academic research. 
The only mention of verification is that assistance with such falls under the FSA 
committee. There are no indications that verification is a mandatory part of SAI 
activities. Rather, it is an option available to members if they wish to implement it 
using external standards. 
Final remarks 
Despite the clear goals and development of thorough best practices and protocols, 
improvements can be made to increase the robustness of the SAI institution, 
particularly related to the implementation of best practices and protocols. Aside from 
the advisory committee the institution is made up solely of companies from the food 
industry. This runs the risk of losing touch with the farm level. Looking at comments in 
the 2015 Annual Report this is currently an issue within the SAI membership. However, 
this is also something that the institution is working to improve, for instance through 
the development of the FSA committee in 2015 as well as by conducting workshops 
bringing together farmers and companies89. 
In terms of reporting their progress, as well as hurdles, SAI is doing good and the level 
of transparency is seemingly high. They provide running updates on activities and 
reports and information regarding the internal and external workings of the platform 
are publicly available. SAI could further improve its information provision regarding 
where and to what extent their standards are being implemented and whether the 
farmers’ self-assessments are carried out successful. One option is to implement a 
verification framework on the farm level to ensure that best practices are implemented 
and upheld. Another, less costly, way is to provide more detailed reports on the exact 
practices, strategies and standards implemented by the SAI members, alongside 
information on where such implementations are taking place. 
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4.2.8 World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 
Start year  1995 
Membership type Private: Only firm actors have governing capacity. 
Members 186 
Website http://www.wbcsd.org/home.aspx  
MRV 
Monitoring and reporting of activities in place and made public. No verification 
procedure. 
Output Yes. Several projects and targets in place. 
Performance Outcomes related to reporting and projects. Biodiversity impacts are unclear. 
 
Background and objective 
WBCSD is a member organisation consisting of more than 200 businesses worldwide. 
Its overarching aim is to “accelerate the transition to a sustainable world by making 
more sustainable businesses more successful”90. Its members represent 19 million 
employees and over $8 trillion in combined revenues. Additionally, WBCSD has a broad 
reach through its global network of more than 70 business councils, representing 
some 5000 businesses91. Within the organisation and its network, the WBCSD focus 
across four economic areas: Energy, Food and Land-use, Cities and Mobility and 
Redefining Values.  
WBCSD recognise that the loss of natural habitats, ecosystem services and biodiversity 
constitute a risk both to the planet and to successful business. In terms of biodiversity 
governance, one of the organisation’s aims is “to provide meaningful and relevant 
contributions to the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Aichi Biodiversity Targets and 
the associated Sustainable Development Goals”92. Some business-related goals relevant 
to biodiversity governance include: 1) increasing business awareness, 2) clarifying 
what can be done to manage and mitigate risks, 3) developing simple but sound tools 
and methodologies across different sectors, and 4) providing guidance, simple metrics 
and indicators to help assess businesses impacts at specific sites and across their 
supply chain93. 
Biodiversity governance 
Membership and participation 
WBCSD is led by an executive committee elected from its member base every two 
years94. The members consist of company CEOs or senior board members. Aside from 
access to the executive committee, all members are represented in the Council and all 
have the option to join or lead cluster Boards. Aside from the direct implication of 
council members, the WBCSD’s global network reaches many thousand businesses 
across the world, two thirds of which resides in developing economies95. 
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Mode of operation 
As a network organisation, the WBCSD primarily relies on its members to take action 
and to encourage other businesses to follow. However, the organisation also provides 
a platform to facilitate and support companies with initiatives and projects. 
The WBCSD’s work is divided across six action clusters as well as several larger 
projects related to the four economic areas. The cluster “Ecosystems & Landscape 
Management” as well as the projects “Forest Solutions Group”, “Non-financial 
Measurement and Valuation” and “Reporting” are the operational structures most 
significant to biodiversity governance96. 
Networking, facilitation, knowledge creation and dissemination are the main tools 
used by the WBCSD to help businesses become more sustainable in their conduct. The 
Council seek to create a critical mass of leading companies to realise cross cutting 
sustainable development in order to rethink and reconstruct the way business is done 
(WBCSD, 2016d). WBCSD aim to help develop and scale up state of the art sustainable 
business solutions across different companies and sectors97. 
Output and performance 
The WBCSD network is very prolific in creating outputs by setting, and continuously 
increasing, targets, implementing and supporting projects, as well as reporting on all 
the projects conducted by their member base. This is illustrated for instance by the 
ambitious “Vision 2050 Initiative”, initiated in 2010 by 29 member companies 
(Wilkinson and Mangalagiu 2012). This institution has received quite some praise from 
companies in that it has provided a set of clear areas for action, concrete visions to 
aim towards, good management tools as well as managed to apply concrete and 
pragmatic business solutions (Wilkinson and Mangalagiu 2012, 379–80). 
Improving companies’ financial and non-financial reporting, relevant to all the 
economic areas covered in the organisation’s portfolio, is one of the WBCSD main 
targets and also part of its outcomes. In the 2016 “Reporting matters” report, the 
organisation informs how 76% of members have improved their reporting practices 
since 2013. 28% have combined financial and non-financial reporting and more than 
50 companies are actively communicating on their progress related to the SDGs in 
their reports98. Additionally, 48% of reports were titled sustainability reports and 80% 
employed the GRI G4 guidelines. 
Other outputs relevant to biodiversity include several reports published since 2010 
related to how businesses can better measure, value, help and integrate biodiversity 
into their business plans. These are primarily written published by the WBCSD while 
some are made in collaboration with renowned institutions such as the IUCN99. These 
reports include examples of what businesses have done, including best practices, as 
well as what they can do moving forward. Finally, they provide a lot of knowledge and 
tools that the companies can use to improve their management and impacts on 
biodiversity. 
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MRV 
Although the WBCSD does not have a formal MRV framework in place, the organisation 
constantly assesses and reports on members’ progress in relation to the organisation’s 
overarching goals. These reports include summaries from Council meetings, collective 
annual assessment reports as well as reports on individual projects conducted by one 
or more of the WBCSD’s members100. Additionally, the WBCSD regularly publish reports 
on accumulated information and knowledge as well as best practices developed 
through research and collaboration within the network. 
Final remarks 
Given the way WBCSD operates, it is difficult to exact which outcomes relevant to 
biodiversity are attributable to its actions. However, considering the goals formulated 
by the WBCSD as well as the performances described above, it seems clear that the 
organisation is doing a good job to include companies into its network, to provide 
information on what needs improvements as well as to develop tools for taking action. 
Looking at Wilkinson and Mangalagiu’s (2012) study of companies’ perception of the 
Vision 2050 Initiative, this picture is confirmed. They consistently report WBCSD has 
been successful in communicating how companies can have an impact, explaining 
what the issues are that they are facing, teaching and providing tools for better 
management of said issues, as well as in encouraging collaborative action across 
sectors.  
WBCSD could make small improvements, for instance by implementing a formal MRV 
framework to better assess its overarching performance across the four economic 
areas. Still, the WBCSD does stand out as a very strong example of a successful 
network, inducing meaningful collaborative voluntary action across several issues 
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5 Final remarks 
The institutional landscape for governing biodiversity has expanded beyond the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. Increasingly, institutions created to govern issue 
areas such as agriculture, climate change, fishery and forestry, influence biodiversity 
directly and indirectly. We refer to this emerging institutional structure as the 
institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity. This report maps and visualises 
the structure of the landscape. It explores functions and types of institutions that 
constitute the institutional landscape, in particular the role of Monitoring, Verification 
and Report. Starting with a sample of 385 institutions governing climate change, 
agriculture, fisheries and forests, we have identified a sub-set of 108 institutions 
occupying the institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity. The selection 
method has followed a conservative approach only considering institutions who clearly 
state a purpose to govern biodiversity. Consequently, institutions that indirectly 
govern biodiversity have been excluded. It is thus likely that the universe of institution 
in the institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity is larger than concluded in 
this report.  
5.1 Methodological contribution 
A key output of this report is a generalizable methodology for visualising a governance 
landscape. While the concept of institutional complexity is not new in itself, there are 
few mappings of institutional landscapes in global governance. The methodology we 
suggest, based on key-word analysis, certainly has some caveats. However, it can in 
principle be applied to any given issue area to map the institutional landscape on 
governing for biodiversity, a useful feature for both practitioners, policy makers and 
researchers. There are some risks of using key-words as a selection tool, including 
overlooking important words and that institutions do not phrase their actions using 
expected words. To minimise these risks, we collaborated with biodiversity experts 
who ensured all relevant keywords were included in our selection process and who 
subsequently went through all the institutions that were not selected to check if any 
had been overlooked. A fundamental strength of using key-word analysis is its 
potential for easily replication. In addition to the selection process, we present a 
carefully selected range of graphs and visualisation tools, useful to depicting the 
governance architecture of any issue area in a nuanced and extensive manner. 
5.2 Visualising the institutional landscape on governing for 
biodiversity  
The dataset in this report comprises 108 public, private and hybrid institutions, operating in 
different ways and consisting of different actor constellations. Mapping and analysing the 
institutional landscape in terms of institutional types and functions we use the governance 
triangle (see Figure 8). The report reaches five main conclusions: 1) It is clear that we have 
moved from a reliance on public governance-institutions towards more diverse multi-
stakeholder participation. 2) There is still a dominance of institutions where only public 
actors are engaged as compared to those where only CSO and firm actors govern. 3) There 
is a strong prominence of hybrid institutions where all three actor-groups are involved. 
Dual-actor collaboration is strongest for public-CSO and CSO-firm. Only one institution has 
firm actors and public actors collaborating. 4) The decagon clearly shows that standards 
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and commitments, followed by information and networking, are the preferred forms of 
governance. This is may be due to a sample bias toward multilateral agreements and 
conventions that are coded as standards and commitments. 5) Through dividing institutions 
into clusters, we have clearly shown that conservation is the preferred approach to 
biodiversity governance, followed by a significant appliance of promoting sustainable use 




Figure 10 Governance triangle and decagon including all 108 institutions in the 
dataset. 
5.3 Participants/members 
The institutional landscape engages a combination of participants, partners and 
members, both the public and private. Understanding who is involved in the 
institutions is important to assess political agency in the governance architecture. In 
our analysis, we only consider members as the actors that have governing capacity 
within a given institution. By applying this selection criteria, we ensure that only the 
actors who are actively engaging with biodiversity governance are include in our 
results. 
Across the 108 institutions in the landscape on governing for biodiversity there are a 
total of 12796 members and 9641 unique members. The vast majority of these 
members are engaged in institutions from the private and hybrid zones 5, 6 and 7, 
both when considering the total and the unique counts. This is a significant finding, 
which suggests that although the institutional landscape comprises a majority of 
public led institutions, there are in fact more actors and more agency involved in 
private and multi-stakeholder governance. Considering that the members included 
across the institutions include nation states, hundreds of cities and regions, large IOs 
as well as prominent international NGOs and firms, the institutional landscape on 
governing for biodiversity constitutes a significant amount political and practical 
agency.  
5.4 Monitoring, reporting and verification 
Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) is important to assess the extent to which 
checks and balances are in place ensuring that institutions actually do what they 
Standards & Commitments Operational
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proclaim to do. In addition, assessing MRV can help indicate the degree of 
institutionalisation of governance institutions. We present results of an MRV analysis, 
carried out on the transnational segment of the institutional landscape on governing 
for biodiversity, which revealed a larger degree of transparency and accountability than 
expected. Of the 55 institutions, only 7 did not have any form of monitoring or 
evaluation in place. A vast majority, not only carried out monitoring, but also reported 
this to the public through online data repositories, newsletters, annual reports and 
other updates. Most surprisingly was the degree to which third party verification is 
being employed. Although, more than half do not use verification measures, we posit 
that such procedures are of varying importance depending on the type of institution. 
For instance, when implementing standards and commitments, verification is more 
instrumental to the whole procedure than it is for a knowledge dissemination network. 
Therefore, it is positive to note that 90% of the transnational standard and 
commitment institutions have verification procedures in place. In summary, our results 
indicate that the level of transparency and thereby accountability is high for the 
transnational institutions in the institutional landscape. It would be interesting to 
examine how the institutions MRV frameworks have developed over time, but such 
data is not available. 
5.5 A closer look at eight cases 
Eight case studies of institutions in the institutional landscape on governing for 
biodiversity illustrate a more detailed image of how the different types of institutions 
function, what type of actors they work with, how they are structured as well as how 
they perform and whether their outcomes are relevant to biodiversity. The eight 
institutions span wide in terms of how they approach biodiversity governance. For 
some institutions, such as the certification schemes GGAP and RSB the link to 
biodiversity is straight-forward and established than for others, e.g. the learning 
network GPFLR. This, however, does not mean that GPFLR’s activities are any less 
relevant or valuable for biodiversity than RSB’s, but merely that they are more difficult 
to assess empirically. It is not possible to link any of the institutions’ actions to 
concrete and direct impacts on biodiversity. However, they all show outputs relevant to 
governing biodiversity, and half perform well in terms of verifiable biodiversity-relevant 
outcomes. In addition, it is positive to discover that most of the institutions are very 
inclusive in the way they operate, both in terms of their organisational structure and 
the types of actors involved in the governance mechanisms, and in terms of the 
stakeholders with which they collaborate. 
Our results suggest the following:  
5. Biodiversity governance has changed from being predominantly carried out by 
public actors towards increasing multi-stakeholder participation. As of December, 
2016, 9641 unique public and private actors are actively engaging with 
biodiversity governance.  
6. Although roughly half of the institutions are purely public, private members 
including civil society organisations, companies and investors, make up roughly 
two thirds of the active members involved with biodiversity governance.  
7. Besides hybrid institutions (those engaging all types of actors: Public, private and 
CSO), joint governance is most frequently public-CSO and CSO-firm.  
8. Certain functional types (what we refer to as roles) stand out as the preferred way 
for institutions to achieve their biodiversity governance objectives. Standards and 
commitments is most commonly applied followed by information and networking.  
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9. Biodiversity governing institutions most frequently frame their activities under the 
scope of conservation (81%) followed by a significant proportion promoting 
sustainable use (35%), whereas only few accentuate access and benefit sharing 
(5%). 
10. Considering MRV, 45 (82%) of the 55 transnational institutions implement at least 
monitoring, 42 (76%) also publish reports and 21 (47%) also verify their actions 
through third party verification procedures. 
11. Verification is used mainly in the institutions where it is essential to the mode of 
operation. 17 (85%) of the 20 institutions enforcing standards and certification 
have full MRV frameworks in place.  
The institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity is characterised by a 
multitude of actors and institutions occupied with governing biodiversity through 
different issue areas. In this report, we have shown a range of results that visualise 
and highlight aspects of how the governance architecture is composed. Biodiversity is 
mainly governed through institutions concerned with issues related to forestry and 
fishery. Additionally, we found that biodiversity governance has certainly moved from 
being governed primarily by public institutions towards a much more inclusive 
structure where private actors have gained relevant agency. Although our results do 
not tell the full story, they provide a robust foundation relevant to practitioners, 
policymakers and scholars interested in further assessing the institutions and the 
actions taken in the name of governing biodiversity. Finally, the method applied in this 
report provide a valuable contribution, applicable to analysing the full extent of global 
governance pertaining to any given issue area. Considering how much of biodiversity 
governance is carried out through institutions that are not primarily focused on 
biodiversity, it begs the question whether this is similarly the case for issues such as 
climate change, energy or agriculture. Without understanding this degree of ‘hidden’ 
governance, it is difficult to assess the full potential and agency in any given issue 
area. Therefore, similar studies could widen the perspective of the increasingly 
fragmented and intertwined array of institutions in global environmental governance. 
An important next step would be to analyse the governance architecture for synergies 
and conflicts between the institutions. 
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Annex A  Keywords 
A.1 Keywords for identifying institutions in the landscape on 
governing for biodiversity 
 
Biodiversity keywords Alternative i Alternative ii 




Conservation of biological 
diversity 
Biological diversity Biodivers* 
 






Other keywords:     





















Degraded ecosystems (ecosystem 



















Equitably managed Equitable management Manage equitably 























IVM Institute for Environmental Studies  
 72  References 
    
 
Biodiversity keywords Alternative i Alternative ii 
Natural habitat* 
  
















Sustainable management Manage sustainably 
 







A.2 Keywords for defining biodiversity clusters 
 
Conservation  Sustainable use  Access and benefit sharing  
Conserv* Sustainable Use Benefit Sharing 
Preserv* Sustainable Management Benefit-Sharing 
Protect* Use Sustainably Sharing of benefits 
Habitat* Manage Sustainably Equitable Management 
NA Stewardship Manage Equitably 
NA Economic Sustainability Fair distribution 
NA Economically sustainable Distribute Fairly 
NA NA Genetic Resource 
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Annex B Database 
Table 5  Our database of institutions in the institutional landscape on governing for biodiversity (see section 3.1 as well as Widerberg, 
Pattberg and Kristensen (2016) for the collection methods). 







Agreement on cooperation in 
the forestry sector and forestry 




Amazon Cooperation Treaty 
Organisation 
Forest 1995 8 Public Public 6 1 1 
http://otca.info/portal/index.php?p=in
dex  
1 AfDB African Development Bank Energy 1964 54 Public Public 7 1 1 http://www.afdb.org/en/ 
1 AFWC 
FAO African Forestry and 
Wildlife Commission 





ASEAN Agreement On The 
Conservation Of Nature And 
Natural Resources 






Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
to the Convention On Biological 
Diversity 




Convention On Biological 
Diversity 
Forest 1992 196 Public Public 1 1 1 http://www.cbd.int/  
1 CCAMLR 
Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources 




Convention On The 
Conservation Of European 
Wildlife And Natural Habitats 




Commission for the 
Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna 
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Convention On International 
Trade In Endangered Species Of 
Wild Fauna And Flora 
Forest 1973 51 Public Public 1 1 0 http://www.cites.org/  
1 COFFI 
UNECE Committee on Forests 
and the Forest Industry 
Forest 1947 2 Public Public 3 1 1 http://www.unece.org/forests.html  
1 COMIFAC Central African Commission Forest 1995 10 Public Public 1 1 1 http://www.comifac.org/  
1 COREP 
Regional Fisheries Committee 
for the Gulf of Guinea 




Convention Concerning The 
Protection Of The Alps 




Permanent Commission for the 
South Pacific 
Fish 1952 4 Public Public 6 1 1 http://cpps-int.org/  
1 CRFM 
Caribbean Regional Fisheries 
Mechanism 
Fish 2003 17 Public Public 2 1 1 http://www.crfm.net/  
1 EIFAAC 
European Inland Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Advisory 
Commission 




Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries 
Agency 
Fish 1979 17 Public Public 3 0 1 http://www.ffa.int/  




EU Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance_and Trade Action 
Plan 




IVM Institute for Environmental Studies 
Beyond the CBD 75  
     








Authoritative Statement of 
Principles for a Global 
Consensus on the Management, 
Conservation and Sustainable 
Development of All Types of 
Forests 
Forest 1992 158 Public Public 1 1 1 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/con
f151/aconf15126-3annex3.htm  
1 GEF Global Environment Facility Energy 1991 166 Public Public 4 1 1 https://www.thegef.org/gef/  
1 IATTC 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission 
Fish 1950 21 Public Public 8 1 0 http://www.iattc.org/  
1 ICCAT 
International Commission For 
The Conservation Of Atlantic 
Tunas 
Fish 1969 50 Public Public 8 1 0 http://www.iccat.int/en/  
1 ICLEI 
ICLEI - Local Governments for 
Sustainability 
Climate 1990 1156 Public Public 8 0 0 http://www.iclei.org/  
1 IOTC Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Fish 1996 14 Public Public 1 1 0 http://www.iotc.org/English/index.php  
1 IPBES 
Intergovernmental Science-
Policy Platform on Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services 
Forest 2012 125 Public Public 3 1 1 http://www.ipbes.net/  
1 ITTO 
International Tropical Timber 
Organisation  
Forest 1986 71 Public Public 5 1 1 http://www.itto.int/  
1 LVFO 
Lake Victoria Fisheries 
Organisation 
Fish 1994 5 Public Public 3 0 1 http://www.lvfo.org/  
1 MRC Mekong River Commission Fish 1995 4 Public Public 3 1 0 http://www.mrcmekong.org/  
1 NagoyaP 
Nagoya Protocol on Access to 
Genetic Resources and the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity 
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North Atlantic Marine Mammal 
Commission 
Fish 1992 4 Public Public 8 1 0 http://www.nammco.no/  
1 NASCO 
North Atlantic Salmon 
Conservation Organisation 
Fish 1983 5 Public Public 8 1 0 http://www.nasco.int/  
1 NEAFC 
Northeast Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission 
Fish 1982 5 Public Public 8 1 0 http://www.neafc.org/  
1 NLBI 
Non-Legally Binding Instrument 
on All Types of Forests 




North Pacific Anadromous Fish 
Commission 
Fish 1993 5 Public Public 8 1 0 http://www.npafc.org/new/index.html  
1 OSPAR OSPAR Commission Fish 1992 16 Public Public 1 1 1 http://www.ospar.org  
1 PACMF 
Protocol For The 
Implementation Of The Alpine 
Convention Concerning 
Mountain Forests 





Protocol on Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of Biological 
and Landscape Diversity to the 
Framework Convention on the 
Protection and Sustainable 
Development of the Carpathians 






Protocol on Sustainable Forest 
Management to the Framework 
Convention on the Protection 
and Sustainable Development of 
the Carpathians 






1 PROFOR Program on Forests Forest 1997 1 Public Public 3 1 0 http://www.profor.info/  
1 Ramsar 
Convention On Wetlands Of 
International Importance 
Especially As Waterfowl Habitat 
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South East Atlantic Fisheries 
Organisation 
Fish 2003 6 Public Public 1 1 1 http://www.seafo.org/  
1 SPRFMO 
South Pacific Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisation 
Fish 2012 13 Public Public 5 1 0 https://www.sprfmo.int/  
1 SWIOFC 
Southwest Indian Ocean 
Fisheries Commission 
Fish 2004 8 Public Public 6 0 1 http://www.swiofp.net/  
1 UN_REDD The UN-REDD Programme Climate 2008 73 Public Public 6 1 1 http://www.un-redd.org/  
1 UNCCD 
Convention To Combat 
Desertification In Those 
Countries Experiencing Serious 
Drought And/Or Desertification, 
Particularly In Africa 
Forest 1994 116 Public Public 1 0 0 http://www.unccd.int/  
1 UNFCCC 
United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change  




United Nations Forum on 
Forests 
Forest 2010 193 Public Public 8 1 0 http://www.un.org/esa/forests/  
1 WCPFC 
Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean Fisheries Commission 
Fish 2004 26 Public Public 8 1 0 http://www.wcpfc.int/  
1 WECAFC 
Western Central Atlantic Fishery 
Commission 
Fish 1973 34 Public Public 1 1 0 
http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/wecafc
/en  
2 CLUA Climate and Land Use Alliance Forest 2010 4 Firm Private 4 1 0 
http://www.climateandlandusealliance
.org/en/about-us-en/  
2 EcoFish EcoFish/Henry & Lisa's Fish 1999 7 Firm Private 1 1 0 http://www.ecofish.com/  




Sustainable Agriculture Initiative 
Platform 




World Business Council on 
Sustainable Development 
Energy 1995 186 Firm Private 2 0 0 http://www.wbcsd.org/home.aspx  
2 WOC World Ocean Council Fish 2008 11 Firm Private 3 0 1 http://www.oceancouncil.org/site/  
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Antarctic and Southern Ocean 
Coalition 
Fish 1978 7 CSO Private 8 1 0 http://www.asoc.org/  








Climate, Community and 
Biodiversity Alliance (CCB 
Standard) 
Climate 2003 5 CSO Private 1 1 0 http://www.climate-standards.org/  
3 DSCC 
Deep Sea Conservation 
Coalition 
Fish 2004 79 CSO Private 1 1 0 
http://www.savethehighseas.org/abou
tus/  
3 FOS Friend of the Sea Fish 2006 1 CSO Private 1 1 0 
http://www.friendofthesea.org/about-
us.asp?ID=9  
3 GS The Gold Standard Climate 2004 1 CSO Private 1 1 0 http://www.goldstandard.org/  
3 Naturland 
Naturland - Association for 
Organic Agriculture 




Program for the Endorsement of 
Forest Certification 
Forest 2003 64 CSO Private 1 1 1 http://www.pefc.org/  
3 PlanVivo Plan Vivo Climate 2008 1 CSO Private 10 1 0 http://www.planvivo.org/  
3 RAC Rainforest Alliance Certified Forest 1987 1 CSO Private 1 1 1 
http://www.rainforest-
alliance.org/about  
3 RT Rainforest Trust Forest 1988 1 CSO Private 10 1 0 https://www.rainforesttrust.org/  
3 SAN Sustainable Agriculture Network AGRI 1997 11 CSO Private 1 1 0 
http://san.ag/web/about-us/who-are-
we-2/  
3 SC SOCIALCARBON Climate 2008 1 CSO Private 1 1 0 http://www.socialcarbon.org/  
 
IVM Institute for Environmental Studies 
Beyond the CBD 79  
     






3 UTZ UTZ AGRI 2002 1 CSO Private 1 0 0 https://www.utz.org/  
4 ALLFISH ALLFISH Fish 2010 6 
Public/ 
Firm 
Hybrid 3 1 0 http://www.allfish.org/about.html  
5 BCI Better Cotton Initiative AGRI 2005 853 
Public/ 
CSO 
Hybrid 1 0 0 http://bettercotton.org/about-bci/  
5 CAFF 
Conservation of Arctic Flora and 
Fauna 
Fish 2013 14 
Public/ 
CSO 
Hybrid 3 1 0 http://www.caff.is  
5 CPF 
Collaborative Patnership on 
Forests 
Forest 2001 14 
Public/ 
CSO 
Hybrid 6 1 1 http://www.cpfweb.org/73947/en/  
5 GCP Global Coffee Platform AGRI 2003 305 
Public/ 
CSO 
Hybrid 1 0 0 http://www.globalcoffeeplatform.org/  
5 GPFLR 
The Global Partnership on 
Forest Landscape Restoration 
Forest 2003 36 
Public/ 
CSO 
Hybrid 6 1 0 
http://www.forestlandscaperestoratio
n.org/  
5 HSA High Seas Alliance Fish 2011 33 
Public/ 
CSO 
Hybrid 6 1 0 http://highseasalliance.org/about-us  
5 IFOAM IFOAM - Organics International AGRI 1972 586 CSO/ Firm Private 3 0 0 https://www.ifoam.bio/en/about-us  
6 FSC Forest Stewardship Council Forest 1993 509 CSO/ Firm Private 1 1 1 https://ic.fsc.org/  
6 ICFA 
International Coalition of 
Fisheries Associations 




International Sustainability and 
Carbon Certification 




Fish 2009 9 CSO/ Firm Private 2 1 1 http://iss-foundation.org/  
6 KG 
The Katoomba Group (Forest 
Trends) 
Forest 1999 1 CSO/ Firm Private 3 1 0 
http://www.katoombagroup.org/abou
t.php  
6 MSC Marine Stewardship Council Fish 1997 1 CSO/ Firm Private 8 0 1 http://www.msc.org  
6 RSPO 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm 
Oil 
Forest 2004 3080 CSO/ Firm Private 1 0 0 http://www.rspo.org/en/who_is_rspo  
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6 RTRS Roundtable on Responsible Soy Forest 2006 159 CSO/ Firm Private 1 0 0 http://www.responsiblesoy.org/  
6 SFI Sustainable Forestry Initiative Forest 1995 1 CSO/ Firm Private 1 1 0 http://www.sfiprogram.org/  
6 TFF 
Tropical Forest Foundation 
(Reduced Impact Logging 
Verified/Standard) 
Forest 1990 1 CSO/ Firm Private 5 1 1 
http://www.tropicalforestfoundation.o
rg/about  
7 4P1000 4 Pour 1000 AGRI 2015 169 
Public/ 
CSO/Firm 
Hybrid 2 1 0 http://4p1000.org/  
7 AFF African Forest Forum Forest 2007 19 
Public/ 
CSO/Firm 
Hybrid 6 1 1 http://www.afforum.org/  
7 APFNet 
Asia-Pacific Network for 
Sustainable Forest Management 
and Rehabilitation 
Forest 2007 31 
Public/ 
CSO/Firm 




7 CBFP Congo Basin Forest Partnership Forest 2002 79 
Public/ 
CSO/Firm 
Hybrid 6 1 1 http://pfbc-cbfp.org/home.html  
7 EI Equator Initiative Fish 2002 15 
Public/ 
CSO/Firm 
Hybrid 3 1 0 http://www.equatorinitiative.org/  
7 FCPF 
Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility 
Climate 2008 62 
Public/ 
CSO/Firm 




Global Partnerships for 
Responsible Fisheries (FishCode 
Programme) 
Fish 1995 195 
Public/ 
CSO/Firm 
Hybrid 9 1 0 
http://www.fao.org/fishery/fishcode/e
n  
7 FLA Forest Legality Alliance Forest 2010 90 
Public/ 
CSO/Firm 
Hybrid 6 1 0 http://www.forestlegality.org/about  
7 GACSA 
Global Alliance for Climate-
Smart Agriculture 
Climate 2014 147 
Public/ 
CSO/ Firm 
Hybrid 3 0 0 http://www.fao.org/gacsa/en/  
7 GFTN 
WWF's Global Forest & Trade 
Network 
Forest 1991 1 
Public/ 
CSO/Firm 
Private 2 1 0 http://gftn.panda.org/about_gftn/  
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7 GFW Global Forest Watch 2.0 Forest 1997 21 
Public/ 
CSO/Firm 
Hybrid 3 1 0 
http://www.globalforestwatch.org/abo
ut/video  
7 GPO Global Partnership for Oceans Fish 2012 8 
Public/ 
CSO/Firm 




International Union for 
Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources 
Forest 1948 1393 
Public/ 
CSO/Firm 
Hybrid 8 1 0 http://www.iucn.org/  
7 RSB 
The Roundtable on Sustainable 
Biofuels (RSB Standard) 
Climate 2007 80 
Public/ 
CSO/Firm 
Hybrid 1 0 1 http://rsb.org/  
7 SFSP 
Sustainable Food Systems 
Programme 
AGRI 2015 22 
Public/ 
CSO/Firm 
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Annex C MRV assessment overview 
Table 6  An overview of the MRV assessment made of the 55 transnational institutions. M = 1 if Monitoring takes place, R = 1 is reporting is 
carried out, V = 1 if internal verification is in place a V = 2 if third-party verification is employed. 
Zone Acronym Name M R V Comment Websites 
2 CLUA 
Climate and Land 






1 1 0 
Independent advisory board, but they seem to only give advice 
regarding impacts of fisheries and aquaculture. They have reports 
explaining why individual fish species were chosen by the Seafood 
Advisory Board. They also have a clear guide as to how they ensure 
seafood quality, but no verification of their standards. 
http://www.ecofish.com/about/selectioncriteria.htm  
http://www.ecofish.com/about/advisory.htm  
2 GGAP Global G.A.P 1 1 2 
Clear 3rd party MRV in place for certified bodies. The Certification 
Integrity Program (CIPRO) monitors and assesses the performance of all 
GLOBALG.A.P.-approved certification bodies. It ensures that certification 
bodies conduct their audits in line with GLOBALG.A.P guidelines and 
procedures and verifies that the same criteria and quality standards 
have been used on a consistent basis. The Integrity Surveillance 
Committee (ISC) assesses integrity issues and certification body non-










1 1 0 
Advisory board "participates in the evaluation of the work of the 
Platform and its progress". Also, members are encouraged to report 
annually. Additionally, they publish annual reports reflecting on their 








1 1 0 
They have an annual report called Reporting Matters where they show 
how reporting have changed member companies conduct and 
performance: "Spanning 163 world-leading companies from more than 
20 sectors and 35 countries, Reporting matters is the outcome of the 
fourth review of the WBCSD members’ sustainability and integrated 
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Zone Acronym Name M R V Comment Websites 
2 WOC 
World Ocean 
Council 1 1 0 
The WOC has 6 focus areas, and for each it reports its goals and 
impacts. Also, an annual summit is held from which reports are 
published online. Further, under Ocean Policy and Governance it is 
stated that they have "Active monitoring and analysis of major policy 
developments for WOC Members". WOC has been formally accredited by 








1 1 2 
ASC has a monitoring and evaluation framework in place which is based 
on the ISEAL code of good practice. There are several published reports 
including, case studies, standard explanation, revision of accreditation 
and certification etc. ASC's standard is a part of ISEAL, meaning that it 













1 1 0 
ASOC publish all their reports and scientific publications. The reports 
include performance reviews where the ASOC analyses and report how 






Alliance for Sero 
Extinction 
0 0 0 
The ASE researches and review habitats globally to identify areas that 
should be protected to conserve endangered species. They publish 
these sites along with information and how they are determined on 
their website.  
In the statutes, it is stated that the ASE should establish a forum for 
best practices and lessons learned which should be presented at the 
CBD COPs starting with number 11. No sign of actual monitoring and 










1 1 0 
BLIP has a detailed list of actions and aims related to each sub 
component/project. It publishes documents like action plans, 
educational and information brochures.They have a whole database 
outlining all IBA areas and explain impacts to biodiversity resulting from 
such protected areas. This constitutes monitoring and reporting.No 








1 1 2 
Clear MRV framework in place with third party verification. 
Three international research institutions help revise the standards. 
http://www.climate-standards.org/  
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1 1 0 
Publishes annual report outlining aims and achievements.  
No mention of verification. 
http://www.savethehighseas.org/aboutus/  
3 FOS Friend of the Sea 1 1 2 
There is a monitoring and reporting framework in place for companies 
that wish to be certified. They measure and report their 
coverages/impact (published on website). Use independent certification 
bodies accredited by the International Accreditation Forum (IAF). 
http://www.friendofthesea.org/public/page/fos%20accr
ed%207%20-english-v2.pdf  
3 GS The Gold Standard 1 1 1 
There is an MRV framework in place that needs to be adhered to in 
order to get the Gold Standard. It includes auditing (monitoring), annual 
reporting and regular performance certification (verification). It is not 
clear whether the verification is 3rd party. All projects and their 










1 1 2 
An MRV framework is in place to ensure that parties applying for 
certification adhere to Naturland's standards. The monitoring and 
reporting takes place both before and after potential certification is 
awarded. The initial inspection process is carried out by a third party. 
The decision to award certification is made by the Naturland 
Certification Committee. However, Naturland itself is annually inspected 
by third party accreditation organisations like the IOAS to ensure that 






Program for the 
Endorsement of 
Forest Certification 
1 1 2 
A multitude of information is reported through the PEFC online platform 
including: case study reports on certified projects and companies, 
impact assessments and aims as well as technical reports outlining 
criteria/standards for achieving certification through a range of focus 
areas.To achieve PEFC certification one need to be accredited by a third-
party certifier that check for adherence to all PEFC's standards in the 






3 PlanVivo Plan Vivo 1 1 2 
Plan vivo engage with a range of projects focusing on PES funding 
through selling certificates. PES monitoring is in place to ensure 
adherence to agreements. For each project design reports, annual 
reports and auditing reports are provided. Verification is carried by 
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3 RAC 
Rainforest Alliance 
Certified 1 1 2 
RAC has a very clear monitoring and reporting scheme for their projects 
in order to measure their work and impact. Furthermore, they have the 
option of providing certification through FSC or SAN (both co-organised 
with RAC). Additionally, they have third party researchers examining 
some of their projects, providing independent assessment of the 
projects. Finally, RAC is a full member of the ISEAL Alliance. ISEAL 







3 RT Rainforest Trust 1 1 0 
There is no mention of any M, R or V frameworks on their website, and 
no presentation of impact from their funding. The examined projects 
only outline what they are trying to do, not whether this has been 
successful. 
However, they do have some monitoring in place through implementing 
guards on the land that the RT buys. Also, they publish annual reports 






1 1 2 
SAN clearly monitors and reports their impacts, achieved through 
certification in the network.They also have a very clear third party 
verification structure in place for all the certification bodies that are part 





3 SC SOCIALCARBON 1 1 2 
In order to be certified by Social carbon a clear MRV framework has to 






3 UTZ UTZ 1 1 2 
UTZ has a very clear monitoring and evaluation system to measure the 
impact of their certification. The findings are published on their 
website. 
To be UTZ certified an entity has to be audited by a third-party CB. The 







4 ALLFISH ALLFISH 0 0 0 
AllFish has a document outlining fishery performance indicators, but it 
is not clear whether or how they implement this. In general, the website 
is not very informative. They have a 2010 work plan, but no mention of 
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5 BCI 
Better Cotton 
Initiative 1 1 2 
BCI publish annual reports and harvest reports. For each 
country/project they have detailed annual information regarding cotton 
production under the BCI standard. The BCI standard system has 6 key 
areas. One of these is a measuring and evaluation mechanism to check 
impacts. 
BCI conducts or commissions certain qualitative sample tests of 
initiatives to verify impacts as well as commissioning independent 
researchers. 









Arctic Flora and 
Fauna 
1 1 0 
CAFF operates by providing policy advice through monitoring, 
assessment and expert groups. On their website, they clearly inform all 








1 1 0 
The CPF has clear clauses encouraging monitoring, assessment and 
reporting. Additionally, they regularly publish progress reports. There is 






Platform 1 1 2 
Progress reports and annual reports are published through their 
website. The baseline common code clearly outlines an imperative to 
continuously monitor and report on several aspects of the coffee 
production. 
Also the global progress framework demand transparent monitoring 
and reporting. A third party independent accreditation/verification 














1 1 0 
FPLR has a clear monitoring and reporting network meant to facilitate 
knowledge transfer and learning. Additionally, they publish case study 
reports of projects where Forest and landscape restoration is being or 
has been implemented. No mention of verification. 
http://www.forestlandscaperestoration.org/case-
study/learning-sites  
5 HSA High Seas Alliance 1 0 0 
In the HSA charter, there is a clear aim to implement a monitoring 
framework, however there are no mentioning of reporting, and no 





IFOAM - Organics 
International 1 1 0 
For each finished project the IFOAM publish reports and studies. 
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6 FSC 
Forest Stewardship 
Council 1 1 2 
FSC has a clear monitoring system in place to measure impact of their 
certification. They also publish report from several projects.Finally they 


















1 1 2 
In the ISSCs sustainability requirements framework it is clearly outlined 
that certified members have to monitor and report on several issue 
areas. 
The ISCC uses third party CBs to do the certification audits. 
Additionally, they publish annual overview of developments within the 
organisation. Additionally, they have an integrity program in place to 



















1 1 2 
A key part of the strategic plan is to continuously monitor evaluate and 
report on tuna conservation. Furthermore, they have an annual 
compliance report where efforts by members are recorded and 
reported. 
Finally they have an independent auditing procedure to ensure that 











0 0 0 
KG does not have a monitoring and reporting system in place. They do 
provide some information of running projects, but no reporting on 
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6 MSC 
Marine Stewardship 
Council 1 1 2 
MSC has a very clear reporting framework and report their impacts 
annually. In the certification program, there is also a clear structure 












1 1 2 
The RSPO provides information on implementation and impact 
assessment. Public annual reports. Furthermore, they have a clear 
procedure as to how they set and review RSPO standards and a 
Standards and Certification Standings Committee that focus amongst 
others: "Organise a credible mechanism for scrutinising and recording 
the production of RSPO defined sustainable palm oil in the various 
environments". This entails monitoring of the program and reporting to 





Responsible Soy 1 1 2 
In the RTRS standards a monitoring and evaluation framework is clearly 
outlined. They clearly report all standard and certification guidelines 












Forestry Initiative 1 1 2 
The SFI has two MRV processes both based on external third party 
verification. One aimed at the certification and the other aimed at 












0 0 0 Website is down! http://www.tropicalforestfoundation.org/about  
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7 4P1000 4 Pour 1000 0 0 0 No mention of any M, R or V. http://4p1000.org/  
7 AFF 
African Forest 
Forum 1 0 0 
A part of the framework is to issue reports on ongoing projects which 
also entails measuring/monitoring. There is, however, no clear 









1 1 0 
In APFNet’s operational framework, it outlines that the board has the 
responsibility to monitor ongoing projects. Also, members have the 
right to receive APF progress reports, and the progress of each project 







Congo Basin Forest 
Partnership 1 0 0 
The advisory committee has the responsibility to regularly perform 
monitoring of activities conducted within the CBFP and to provide 
advice to the CBFP Facilitator. However, there are no mentioning/sign of 
a reporting or verification framework on impacts. 
http://pfbc-cbfp.org/workingstructure.html  
7 EI Equator Initiative 1 1 0 
The initiative hands out the Equator Prise and publish reports/books 
with information from case studies and prise winning initiative. In order 
to win the prise: "Initiatives that have improved community wellbeing 
and local livelihoods through the protection, restoration and 
sustainable management of forests; sustainable agriculture and food 
security; community-based adaptation to climate change; or biodiversity 
conservation." This is considered monitoring by the technical committee 
and the publications of case studies as reporting. However, there is no 







Partnership Facility 1 1 0 
The FCP has two M&E frameworks in place. One evaluating country level 
REDD+ programs and one evaluating the organisation's performance. 












1 1 1 
In the FishCode’s code of conduct there are clear clauses for monitoring 
and reporting. Furthermore, it is mentioned that reported data should 
be verified by appropriate systems, however as such system is not 
identified this is recorded simply as non-third party verification. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm  
 
IVM Institute for Environmental Studies 
Beyond the CBD 91  
     
Zone Acronym Name M R V Comment Websites 
7 FLA 
Forest Legality 
Alliance 0 0 0 
No mention of any type of M, R or V. They use already established legal 
mechanisms to achieve their goals. No impact assessment framework. 
http://www.forestlegality.org/about  
7 GACSA 
Global Alliance for 
Climate-Smart 
Agriculture 
0 0 0 No mention of any type of M, R or V. http://www.fao.org/gacsa/en/  
7 GFTN 
WWF's Global 
Forest & Trade 
Network 
1 1 0 
In their sector-specific position papers there are clauses for monitoring 
and evaluation. Online they provide specific impact data for each 





Watch 2.0 1 1 0 
"Global Forest Watch (GFW) is an interactive online forest monitoring 
and alert system " Furthermore, they report online all the data they are 
provided.  





0 0 0 Website is down! http://www.globalpartnershipforoceans.org/  
7 IUCN 
International Union 
for Conservation of 
Nature and Natural 
Resources 
1 1 0 
The IUCN has a very clear M&E policy framework as well as publishing 










1 1 2 
There is a clear system in place for monitoring and verification of 
certification by third party CBs. Furthermore, they have a framework in 
place for measuring and reporting their impacts. The RSB has further 
been evaluated by an independent body in 2015 to assure general 











1 1 0 
A progress report was prepared to the UN secretary general in 2015. 
This can be seen as M and R. No mention of verification. 
http://www.unep.org/10yfp/Portals/50150/downloads/
ECOSOC_10YF_nov13.pdf  
 
